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Trends 2005

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Information in the public interest

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Preface

This book is the first publication of the new Pew Research Center, an independent, nonpartisan “fact tank” that generates information on important issues and trends — primarily through public opinion surveys, social science research, and news reporting and analysis.

The subject matters we explore in “Trends: 2005” are in the public square and undergoing fundamental change. A chapter summary:

1. **The American Public** examines public opinion and values in the wake of a highly polarized presidential campaign that, by a small but decisive margin, finally broke the electoral dead heat of 2000. It analyzes the contours of the post-9/11 landscape that led to President George W. Bush’s reelection victory, and it looks at public attitudes toward his second-term agenda.
2. **Religion & Public Life** explores an unusual and relatively new phenomenon at the intersection of religion and politics — the fact that people’s partisan preferences align with how frequently they attend church.
3. **Media** looks at news organizations through the eyes of their readers and viewers. It finds that the mainstream media’s credibility has plummeted and their audiences have scattered — in some cases, into partisan enclaves.
4. **Internet** examines the social impact of a revolutionary communication technology that has done as much to transform the way people live as — what? — The television? The telephone? The telegraph? The printing press? Choose your favorite comparison. They all apply.
5. **Hispanics** looks at how the current wave of immigrants has turned Latinos into this nation’s largest minority group — and how their children are on a path to make an even bigger mark.
6. **The States** examines policy innovation and political alignments in the 50 state capitals, where budgets have to be balanced and where policy choices have an immediate impact on the lives of citizens.
7. **Global Opinion** tracks and analyzes the attitudes of people around the world toward the United States, and finds that, among allies and adversaries alike, anti-Americanism is on the march.

About the Pew Research Center

The Center was created in mid-2004 by the Pew Charitable Trusts (www.pewtrusts.org), a Philadelphia-based public charity, to bring together under one roof six previously separate information projects. These six projects are the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Stateline.org, the Pew Internet & American Life Project, the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, the Pew Hispanic Center and the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

We are mainly a mix of social scientists and journalists, and we hope we have inherited the best features of both bloodlines — the intellectual range and methodological rigor of a university; the restless curiosity and down-to-earth language of a newsroom.

We have no partisan agenda, no dog in any policy fight. The closest thing we have to an orthodoxy was given voice two centuries ago by James Madison: “Popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power that knowledge gives.”

We are grateful to the board and staff of the Trusts, especially President Rebecca W. Rimel and Director of Information Initiatives Donald Kimelman, first for creating the information projects and more recently for establishing the Center. We hope that “Trends: 2005” will help fulfill the mission that they — and Madison — have laid out.

The **Pew Research Center** is a nonpartisan “fact tank” that generates timely research, polling and news coverage on the issues, attitudes and trends that shape America. The work of the Center is carried about by six Projects: The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Stateline.org, Pew Internet & American Life Project, The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Pew Hispanic Center and Pew Global Attitudes Project. These projects are supported by a core management staff.

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The **Pew Research Center for the People & the Press** is an independent opinion research group that studies public attitudes toward the press, politics and public policy issues. It charts trends in values and fundamental political and social attitudes; it also does regular national surveys that measure public attentiveness to major news stories. All of our survey results are available at www.people-press.org.

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The American Public

Opinions and Values in a 51%-48% Nation

President George W. Bush's reelection victory last year was narrow in percentage terms — 51% to 48% — but historic in raw numbers. He captured over 62 million votes, 3 million more than his Democratic opponent and 7.5 million more than any other winning presidential candidate in history. Bush's record vote total — and, for that matter, John Kerry's — came from an energized electorate that was paying close attention to the campaign.


Yet as Bush begins his second term less than three months later, his policy agenda differs from the public's, the nation's partisan divisions are as deep as ever, and there is no sign of a reelection honeymoon on the horizon.

So what was November 2 all about?

Bush won for one reason above all others: The electorate judged him to be the stronger leader at a time when Americans feel threatened by terrorism. National security values loom much larger in shaping partisanship than they did in the 1990s, a new analysis by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press has found. And exit polling found that Bush's clear stands on the issues and his strong leadership were far more important to his supporters than was his strong religious faith. More than anything else, November 2 will be remembered, figuratively as well as literally, as the first post-September 11 presidential election.

Even so, differences of opinion about security and foreign policy have widened as Americans have struggled among themselves with the decision to go to war in Iraq and, more recently, over how to achieve peace there. The debate over the war shattered the mood of national unity that followed 9/11 and magnified the stark divisions between Republicans and Democrats on a broad range of issues. The election showed that not only did backers of Bush and Kerry hold different positions, but they also saw different realities as they assessed the condition of the U.S. economy and the way things were going in Iraq.

Presidential Approval Ratings at Start of Second Term (1957-2005)



Note: 1957-1985 results from Gallup Poll.
Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, January 2005

“**B**ush won for one reason above all others: The electorate judged him to be the stronger leader at a time when Americans feel threatened by terrorism.”

With such sharp contrasts between partisans, however, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that centrists still control the balance of political power and that fundamental American values reflect a mix of both consensus and contention. Broad public agreement about the importance of religion, the power of the individual and the need for environmental protection is often overshadowed by enduring differences over social issues and by the re-emergence of hawks and doves on foreign policy and national security.

The Second Term

Bush begins his second term with an approval rating of 50%, reflecting the tough election campaign just concluded and perhaps foreshadowing contentious times ahead. His approval mark is far below the ratings enjoyed by Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Reagan and Clinton as they began their second terms.

Bush's support from his own party is on par with what those presidents enjoyed — 89% of Republicans approve of the way he is handling his job. What sets him apart from other recent two-term presidents, however, are the low marks he receives from the opposition. By more than four to one (77% to 17%), Democrats disapprove of Bush's job performance. Bush also gets lower marks from independents than other recent presidents received on the cusp of their second terms.

A Changing Agenda

As the president and the new Congress begin work, there are signs that domestic issues — largely shunted to the background during the campaign — are making a comeback. However, the public's policy agenda differs in several key respects from the one being proposed by the president.

A steadily growing number of Americans want action to reduce the federal budget deficit, and there is growing support as well for Congress and the president to deal with the problems of the poor and those lacking health insurance.

And while seven in ten say making the Social Security system financially stable should be a top priority for the coming year, the public believes that the health care system currently is in greater need of repair than Social Security, the tax system or the legal system, all of which have been targeted by the White House as major policy priorities for the coming year. Nearly half of all Americans (47%) believe the Social Security system now works pretty well and needs only minor changes. That compares with just 27% who believe the health care system works fairly well and 36% who say the same about the education system.

“A steadily growing number of Americans want action to reduce the federal budget deficit, and there is growing support as well for Congress and the president to deal with the problems of the poor and those lacking health insurance.”


In terms of the overall policy agenda, Americans attach the greatest importance to defending the nation against terrorism and strengthening the economy — 75% rate these as top priorities. Yet while terrorism dominated public priorities in the years immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks, it now is one among many top-tier issues, including the economy, education, Social Security, jobs and Medicare.

Public interest in helping the poor and needy, which fell dramatically in the aftermath of 9/11, has rebounded in the years since. Roughly six in ten (59%) want the president and Congress to make dealing with the problems of poor and needy people a top priority. This is up significantly from a low of 44% in January 2002, and nearly matches the 63% who rated helping the poor as a top priority a year earlier.


Opinion on providing health insurance to the uninsured has followed almost an identical pattern, plummeting in importance following the attacks, but slowly rising again to its pre-9/11 levels. The shift on health insurance is driven largely by Democrats and independents. Eight in ten Democrats (81%) now cite insuring the uninsured as a major priority, compared with 35% of Republicans. The partisan gap over expanding health insurance — now a staggering 46 points — has nearly doubled over the past three years.

Public Priorities Since 9/11


SOME ISSUES REGAIN PUBLIC ATTENTION ...



... OTHERS DROP AND NEVER REBOUND ...



... BUT CORE ISSUES BARELY CHANGE



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

Note: Lines show the percent considering each issue a top priority for the president and Congress in the coming year.

Top Domestic Priorities for Bush and Congress

PERCENT CONSIDERING EACH AS A "TOP PRIORITY"	JAN. 2001	JAN. 2002	JAN. 2003	JAN. 2004	JAN. 2005
Strengthening nation's economy	81	71	73	79	75
Defending U.S. against terrorism	—	83	81	78	75
Improving educational system	78	66	62	71	70
Securing Social Security	74	62	59	65	70
Improving job situation	60	67	62	67	68
Securing Medicare	71	55	56	62	67
Providing insurance to uninsured	61	43	45	54	60
Dealing with problems of poor	63	44	48	50	59
Reducing budget deficit	—	35	40	51	56
Regulating HMOs	66	50	48	50	54
Reducing crime	76	53	47	53	53
Strengthening the military	48	52	48	48	52
Protecting the environment	63	44	39	49	49
Reducing middle-class taxes	66	43	—	44	48
Dealing with energy problems	46*	42	40	46	47
Increasing minimum wage	40*	—	—	38	43
Dealing with moral breakdown	51	45	39	45	41
Tax simplification	—	—	—	—	39
Developing missile defense	41	39	42	35	35
Making tax cuts permanent	—	—	30	—	34
Dealing with global trade	37	25	—	32	32
Limiting awards in lawsuits	—	—	—	—	27
Gay marriage amendment	—	—	—	22	27

* Asked in early September, 2001

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

The nation's ballooning budget deficit also is a growing concern; 56% rank this as a top priority today, up from 51% a year ago and just 35% in 2002. However, public focus on the deficit has yet to reach the levels of the mid-1990s, when nearly two thirds (65% in 1994) said reducing the deficit was a top priority.

But not all domestic issues have seen an increase in public emphasis. For example, reducing crime, regulating HMOs and protecting the environment — all of which were rated as top priorities by 60% or more before September 11 — declined in importance afterward and have seen little or no rebound in public interest since that time.

A number of the president's announced policy objectives for the coming year also rate relatively low on the public's list of priorities. Most notably, barely a quarter of Americans (27%) view passing legislation that would limit the amount of money courts can award in personal injury lawsuits as a top priority; the same modest number attaches high priority to a constitutional amendment prohibiting gay marriages. President Bush's two major tax proposals — to make the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent and to simplify the tax code — rank only slightly higher (34% and 39% as a top priority, respectively).

Close to Parity in Party Identification


Based on Pew polls conducted throughout 2004, the Democratic Party held a slight edge in party affiliation among the general public (33% to 30%).

More significant, of course, was the fact that Republicans turned out at a higher rate on Election Day and therefore matched Democratic turnout (37% each), according to the exit poll conducted by the National Election Pool. That marked the first presidential election since modern exit polling began a generation ago that Republicans had equaled the Democrats in turnout.

From the time that Bush first took office in 2001, party affiliation among the public has undergone significant changes. Early in Bush's first term, the Democrats held roughly the same advantage in party identification as they enjoyed during Bill Clinton's second term in office. Democrats had held a much more substantial advantage in partisan identification for most of the 20th century.

Republicans made gains in party affiliation following the September 11 attacks, bringing the parties into virtual parity, but slipped back slightly in 2004. The Democrats have maintained a slight lead for most of the past year — though, as noted above, that partisan edge among the general public did not translate into a Democratic advantage among those who actually voted last November.

Party Identification Trends, 1992-2004



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

Party Identification Trend, By Demographic Groups

	2000		2002		2004		2004 N
	REP.	DEM.	REP.	DEM.	REP.	DEM.	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Total	28	33	30	31	30	33	29,092
Men	30	28	32	27	31	29	13,699
Women	26	38	29	35	28	37	15,393
White	32	29	35	27	34	29	23,828
Black	6	65	6	63	6	63	3,005
Hispanic	21	42	22	36	20	40	1,915
Conservative	49	23	50	22	51	22	10,908
Moderate	21	39	24	35	22	36	11,289
Liberal	9	52	9	47	8	51	5,365
18-29	25	30	27	27	25	29	4,855
30-49	29	32	32	30	31	32	10,869
50-64	28	35	30	33	29	35	7,313
65+	30	40	32	38	32	40	5,642
< H.S. grad	19	39	20	36	21	40	2,304
H.S. grad	26	34	29	32	28	33	8,355
Some college	31	32	34	30	32	31	8,106
Coll. grad+	34	30	36	29	33	32	10,178
White Catholic	29	34	32	30	31	32	4,934
White Protestant	39	27	42	24	41	26	12,490
Evangelical	43	26	47	23	49	22	6,313
Mainline	34	29	35	27	32	29	6,177
Jewish	16	52	18	51	17	55	561
No religion	16	28	16	27	15	31	2,751
< \$20,000	19	43	20	39	19	42	4,384
\$20,000-\$30,000	26	37	26	35	24	37	3,281
\$30,000-\$50,000	29	34	31	32	30	34	6,155
\$50,000-\$75,000	34	31	35	29	36	29	4,421
\$75,000 +	37	27	39	27	38	29	6,768

Where the Parties Stand

The Democratic Party continues to hold a solid advantage among African-Americans, Jews, Hispanics, liberals, women, people who did not finish high school, lower-income individuals and seculars.

Republicans have a big edge among conservatives and White Evangelical Protestants, and hold smaller but significant advantages among middle- and upper-income citizens and whites. The parties are about equally represented among people with college experience, White Catholics and men.

There has been relatively little change in party identification among most of these groups in the population. Republican identification among White Evangelical Protestants has grown over the past four years, but black support for the Democratic Party has not wavered. President Bush posted gains among Hispanic voters in the election of 2004, but Democrats still outnumber Republicans by two to one in this growing segment of the population.

Bush at the Midpoint

Bush's victory on November 2 provided him with the opportunity to broaden his base of support. But the early signs suggest that the partisan reactions toward Bush that characterized much of his first term will continue into his second.

This is evident when Bush's job performance ratings are compared with those of other recently reelected presidents. Bush enjoys roughly the same overwhelming support from his own party as did Presidents Clinton, Reagan, Nixon and Eisenhower at or near the start of their second terms.

What is striking, however, is the massive disapproval he generates among members of the opposition party. Pew's January 2005 survey showed that Democrats disapprove of Bush's job performance by more than four to one (77% to 17%). By contrast, Republicans disapproved of President Clinton at the start of his second term by a two-to-one margin (61% to 31%). And previous two-term GOP presidents — Reagan, Nixon and Eisenhower — attracted sizable crossover backing. Indeed, a narrow majority of Democrats gave Eisenhower a positive job rating early in his second term.


Bush won reelection despite the fact that his approval rating had not exceeded 50% since January 2004. In the past year, it has moved within a fairly narrow range — from a low of 43% in late April 2004, a period when violence was intensifying in Iraq, to a high of 50% in January of this year.

Job Approval Ratings at Start of Second Term, by Respondents' Party ID

	PRESIDENT'S PARTY	OTHER PARTY	INDEPENDENTS
BUSH	%	%	%
Approve	89	17	47
Disapprove	7	77	44
CLINTON			
Approve	86	31	54
Disapprove	8	61	33
REAGAN			
Approve	88	39	61
Disapprove	7	54	25
NIXON			
Approve	87	42	60
Disapprove	8	45	28
EISENHOWER			
Approve	85	52	69
Disapprove	7	35	17

Source: Data from Gallup surveys conducted in April 1957, Dec. 1972, and Jan. 1985, and Pew Research Center surveys in Jan. 1997 and Jan. 2005.

Bush's Job Approval



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

Strength of Support In Presidential Elections

	STRONG	SOFT	TOTAL
2004	%	%	%
Bush	39	9	48
Kerry	32	13	45
2000			
Bush	32	14	46
Gore	26	17	43
1996			
Dole	20	18	38
Clinton	29	23	52
1988*			
Bush	27	26	53
Dukakis	22	19	41
1984			
Reagan	39	18	57
Mondale	25	14	39
1980			
Reagan	25	22	47
Carter	20	24	44
1976			
Ford	26	23	49
Carter	26	22	48
1972			
Nixon	41	20	61
McGovern	19	16	35

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press; final pre-election polls among likely voters
* Gallup Poll findings 1972-1988.

Yet Bush's enduring advantage, one that was crucial to his reelection, is the unwavering loyalty he receives from the GOP base. Pew's final pre-election survey in early November, which showed the president holding a small 48%-to-45% lead overall, found Bush holding a sizable edge over John Kerry in the intensity of his support. Indeed, Bush drew the highest percentage of strong support of any presidential candidate in the past two decades.

That pattern has continued since the election. In December, Pew found 72% of Republicans expressing very strong approval for Bush's job performance — on par with Democratic support for Bill Clinton when impeachment proceedings were moving forward in 1998. And Bush evokes nearly as much strong negative sentiment. In December, 63% of Democrats very strongly disapproved of how Bush handled his job. That is significantly greater than the level of strong disapproval among Republicans toward Clinton during the impeachment crisis.

Perception Meets Reality

The nation's contentious political atmosphere is not lost on the public. In fact, this is a rare point on which majorities of both parties agree. In December 2004, Pew found 77% of Democrats and 61% of Republicans saying the country is more politically divided than in the past.

Moreover, people perceive this increasing partisan tension not only in the context of national politics and policies, but also in how they relate to friends and acquaintances. More than half of all Americans (53%) said the people they know are disagreeing more about politics these days. Within their own circles, Democrats are much more apt than Republicans to perceive political divisiveness; 65% of Democrats said this, compared with only 44% of Republicans.

Why do Americans think the country is more divided today? Not surprisingly, the war in Iraq is seen as the most important reason. Roughly a third (32%) of those who believe the nation is more divided than in the past point to the war as the primary factor; far fewer cite economic issues, or moral values and such social concerns as gay marriage.

Most See a More Divided Nation

THE COUNTRY IS...	TOTAL %	PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
		REP. %	DEM. %	IND. %
More politically divided	66	61	77	64
Not more divided	26	32	16	29
Don't know	8	7	7	7
	100	100	100	100
PEOPLE YOU KNOW ARE...				
More divided over politics	53	44	65	52
Not more divided	40	51	29	40
Don't know	7	5	6	8
	100	100	100	100

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

What's Dividing America?

	ALL %	PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
		REP. %	DEM. %	IND. %
Foreign policy (net)	36	35	39	33
War in Iraq	32	31	36	28
Terrorism	3	4	2	3
Domestic issues (net)	19	15	22	18
Economy/jobs	13	10	17	11
Taxes	2	1	2	*
Moral values and issues (net)	14	15	15	13
Morals, values	3	5	2	3
Religion	5	5	5	5
Gay marriage, gay rights	2	4	3	1
Abortion	2	2	2	1
Leaders (net)	11	7	13	13
Bush	6	3	8	8
Republicans/conservatives	1	—	2	*
Democrats/liberals	1	2	*	*
Rich-poor gap	3	1	5	2

Note: Based on respondents who said that America is more divided politically or that people they knew were more politically divided.
Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

New Look At Political Values

Late last year, Pew updated many of its long-term trends on the public's political, economic and social values. That survey of 2,000 Americans, conducted December 1-16, found much to confirm the widespread perceptions of increasing political contentiousness. Most notably, the survey showed that the war in Iraq not only has driven a wedge between Republicans and Democrats but has intensified the partisan gap over fundamental national security attitudes. It has made Republicans more hawkish and Democrats more dovish.

Yet this survey cannot be viewed as simply a study in rising partisanship. It also confirmed that a number of consensus values endure, which may be a surprising finding in today's political climate. For example, Americans overwhelmingly agree on the importance of religion, on the power of personal initiative, and on the need to protect the environment. They are likewise bound by skepticism toward big business and they generally agree that there has been movement toward racial progress.

Of course, consensus dissolves over more specific issues, such as the trade-off between the costs and benefits of environmental protection. Yet it remains the case that the points of public agreement on major subjects have been largely overshadowed by the partisan tenor of the times.

Moreover, many of the questions that divide the public are not partisan in nature. Immigration, which could emerge as a major issue in Bush's second term, splits both parties fairly evenly. And when it comes to opinions on government, the level of partisanship has actually decreased over time. GOP hostility toward government — a dominant attitude among Republicans in the early 1990s — has softened considerably.

Security Divide Deepens

Last year's election underscored the stark divisions over the war in Iraq. The exit poll by the National Election Pool found that 79% of Bush voters said the war had improved U.S. security, while 88% of Kerry voters said it had not.

Increasingly, that same divisiveness is seen in Pew's long-term foreign policy and national security measures. Indeed, our values survey showed that, taken together, attitudes on the efficacy of force versus diplomacy, and on the obligation of Americans to fight for their country, are now by far the strongest predictors of whether a person is a Republican or a Democrat. These attitudes surpass opinions on every other subject — including attitudes toward homosexuality, religion and the role of government in helping the poor — in predicting partisanship.

Of course, differences over America's place in the world are not new. Indeed, it would be hard to argue that the political tensions over national security are any greater now than they were during the Vietnam or Korean Wars. Even in the 1990s, when national security largely receded as a public concern, there were substantial disagreements over the efficacy of military force and over Americans' obligation to fight for their country.

What has changed since then is the extent to which attitudes toward national security influence partisan affiliation and voting decisions. During the 1990s, attitudes about government, welfare and business — as well as opinions concerning homosexuality — were most important in determining party affiliation, voting decisions, and presidential approval. But today, a single question, regarding the relative effectiveness of force versus diplomacy, is as powerful a predictor of party identification as the full set of values questions were in 1999.

Democratic Shift on Security


Significantly, the values study found little change in the public's overall views on basic foreign policy attitudes, even as Republicans and Democrats have grown further apart. A modest majority of all Americans (55%) said in December 2004 that good diplomacy, not military strength, is the best way to ensure peace. That was the same number who held that view in 1999 and virtually the same as in 1996 (53%).

Top Five Values Related to Party Identification

1999	INDEX OF INFLUENCE	2004	INDEX OF INFLUENCE
Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient	10	The best way to ensure peace is through military strength	24
Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest	10	We should all be willing to fight for our country, whether it is right or wrong	12
Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society	10	As Americans we can always find ways to solve our problems	10
Poor people today have it easy because of government benefits	9	Poor people today have it easy because of government benefits	8
The government should do more to help needy Americans	8	This country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment	8

Note: Index numbers reflect the relative impact of each item in explaining party identification. Based on multiple regression analysis. Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace




Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

However, an increasing number of Republicans subscribe to the view that military strength – rather than effective diplomacy – is the best way to ensure peace. The percentage endorsing diplomacy as the better option dropped from 46% in 1999 to 32% in 2004.

The movement among Democrats – in the opposite direction – has been just as dramatic. In the 1990s, roughly 60% of Democrats expressed the view that good diplomacy was the best way to ensure peace; that number rose to 76% in 2004.

We should all be willing to fight for our country, whether it is right or wrong



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

A similar pattern is evident in views on the obligation to fight for the country, whether it is right or wrong. As in the 1990s, the public remained split on this measure – 46% thought a person should fight whether the country is right or wrong, while an identical number said it is acceptable for someone to decline to fight in a war they see as morally wrong.

Since 1999, an increasing number of Republicans express the view that a person has an obligation to fight, while Democrats have moved in the opposite direction. By 66% to 27%, Republicans said that people should fight for the country, right or wrong; Democrats, by a comparable margin, said it is acceptable to refuse to fight in a war that one sees as morally wrong.

Election Intensifies Differences

Pew first found evidence of a growing political gap in national security values more than a year ago, in our major survey on the American political landscape in November 2003. If anything, the 2004 election appears to have intensified these differences.

Roughly two thirds of Bush voters said that using overwhelming force is the best way to defeat global terrorism. An even larger percentage of Kerry voters said that relying too much on military force creates hatred that leads to more terrorism.

Bush and Kerry voters also expressed starkly different views about the U.S. role in world affairs. While a majority of Bush voters endorsed an activist foreign policy, just as many Kerry voters instead agreed with the statement: "We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home."

Consensus Amid Conflict

However, what is frequently overlooked in discussions of public values is the extent to which there is a large measure of agreement, at least on general principles.

For example, roughly three quarters of Americans said that "religion is a very important part of my life." And slightly more — 78% — believe that everyone has it in his or her own power to succeed. These are values that transcend politics and set Americans apart from people in other wealthy nations.

Conflicting Views of America's Place in the World

	TOTAL	BUSH VOTERS	KERRY VOTERS	DIDN'T VOTE
	%	%	%	%
Military force is best way to defeat terrorism	39	66	17	33
Too much force creates hatred that leads to more terrorism	51	25	76	55
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	10	9	7	12
	100	100	100	100
Take allies' interests into account	53	43	68	47
Follow own national interests	37	49	25	38
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	10	8	7	15
	100	100	100	100
Best for country to be active in world affairs	44	57	37	34
We should concentrate on problems at home	49	37	57	59
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	7	6	6	7
	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	2,000	808	706	358

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

Consensus Values

	1994	1999	2004
RELIGIOUS FAITH			
	%	%	%
Religion is a very important part of my life	n/a	75	74
Religion is not that important to me		22	24
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)		2	2
		100	100
PERSONAL EMPOWERMENT & OPTIMISM			
Success in life is pretty much outside of our control	18	15	16
Everyone has it in their own power to succeed	79	80	78
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	3	5	6
	100	100	100
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION			
This country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment	78	80	77
This country has gone too far in its efforts to protect the environment	19	15	18
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	3	5	5
	100	100	100
PERCEPTIONS OF BUSINESS POWER			
Too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies	76	77	77
The largest companies do not have too much power	19	17	16
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	5	6	7
	100	100	100
BELIEF IN BLACK PROGRESS			
The position of blacks in American society has improved in recent years	72	78	73
There hasn't been much real progress for blacks in recent years	25	18	20
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	3	4	7
	100	100	100

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

There also are more concrete issues on which much of the public holds similar values. By more than four to one, Americans said the country “should do whatever it takes” to protect the environment. And by a similar margin — 77%-16% — the public felt that the largest companies have too much power. Even on the contentious subject of race, significant majorities of Americans said that the position of blacks has improved in recent years.

Where Consensus Splinters

As is frequently the case, there was greater consensus on fundamental values relating to religion, business and other subjects than on more practical questions of policy implementation. Despite the overwhelming sense that big business is too powerful, for example, there was no agreement over the wisdom of using government to counteract that power.

The public also was divided over whether businesses make too much profit — 53% thought they do, while 39% said that corporate profits are reasonable. This opinion has remained stable over the past decade, despite the corporate scandals of recent years. Republicans and Democrats have very different views on this question, with a 64% majority of Democrats saying profits are too high compared with only 46% of Republicans who felt this way.

Opinion on Corporate Profits

	%
Corporations make too much profit	53
Corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit	39
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	8
	100

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

Religion and Morality

Although Americans are bound by their sense of the personal importance of religion, they divide almost evenly over whether belief in God is a prerequisite of personal morality. Roughly half assert that it is necessary to believe in God to be a moral person, while nearly as many disagree.

This is not a partisan question; Democrats and Republicans are each split on the issue. But the link between faith and morality divides the public in other ways. Only about a third of college graduates (35%) say a person needs to believe in God in order to be moral, while more than two thirds (68%) of those with no high school diploma feel this way. Whites are split evenly on the question, but blacks by a three-to-one margin (72% to 24%) see faith in God as necessary for a moral life.

Belief in God and Morality

	%
It IS necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values	51
It is NOT necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values	46
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	3
	100

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

Personal Empowerment

Americans not only overwhelmingly believe that all people have it in their power to succeed, they also see hard work as the key to success. About two thirds agreed with the statement that "most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're willing to work hard." That is down a bit from the boom years of 1999 and 2000, but majorities of Americans at all income levels still think hard work can lead to success.

The public is somewhat less bullish about the country's ability to deal with problems, a judgment that is made to some degree through a partisan lens. Overall, 59% thought that Americans "can always find ways to solve our problems and get what we want"; 36% said the country cannot solve many of its problems. Nearly three quarters of Republicans said Americans generally are capable of dealing with their problems, but only about half of Democrats agreed.

As in the past, opinion is split fairly evenly over whether there are any limits to growth in this country. A narrow 51% majority said there are no limits to growth, but as many as 41% thought that Americans "should learn to live with less."

The Cost of Environmental Protection

	%
Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy	31
Stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost	60
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	9
	100

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

Black-White Gap on Race in America

	TOTAL	WHITE	BLACK
	%	%	%
Position of blacks has improved	73	77	56
Hasn't been much real progress for blacks in recent years	20	17	38
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	7	6	6
	100	100	100
Discrimination is main reason many blacks can't getting ahead	27	24	44
Blacks who can't get ahead are responsible for their condition	60	63	43
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	13	13	13
	100	100	100

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

Protecting the Environment

Large and unchanging majorities of the public endorse environmentalism. However, for many the potential economic costs associated with stricter environmental laws are more problematic.

Ideology and partisanship strongly influence views on this measure. By more than six to one (83% to 12%), liberal Democrats said that tougher environmental laws are worth the cost. Just 49% of conservative Republicans agreed, while 41% thought such laws cost too many jobs and hurt the economy.

How Much Black Progress?

Americans continue to take a positive view of the amount of progress achieved by African-Americans. By more than three to one (73% to 20%), the public said that the position of blacks in American society has improved in recent years.

There was a sizable split between whites and African-Americans on this question, though even among blacks a majority (56%) said progress has been made. Attitudes on this value have been stable for a decade, among whites and blacks.

Most Americans endorsed the view that blacks who have been unable to make gains are mostly responsible for their own circumstances. But this is much more of a settled issue for whites than for African-Americans, who are evenly divided over whether blacks who cannot get ahead are responsible for their fate, or whether racial discrimination is to blame.


Little Change in Views on Homosexuality

An earlier Pew survey on the nation's political landscape, conducted in November 2003, showed that despite the signs of increasing polarization on many issues, there was no evidence of a growing gap on social and cultural values. In spite of the debate over the role that moral values and issues such as gay marriage played in Bush's victory, that remained pretty much the case in Pew's post-election values survey.

For example, on the question of whether homosexuality should be accepted or discouraged, which Pew has been measuring for a decade, 49% said it should be accepted, while 44% thought homosexuality should be discouraged. That was consistent with results from surveys in 2000 and 1999; in the mid-1990s, the balance was tilted slightly the other way, with pluralities saying homosexuality should be discouraged.

There are major differences between Republicans and Democrats on this value — 58% of Democrats and 36% of Republicans said that homosexuality should be accepted and not discouraged. But in contrast with attitudes toward national security, where there has been a growing partisan gap, the balance of opinion among Republicans and Democrats on this question has changed very little since the 1990s.

Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

Government Protecting Morality

	TOTAL	REP.	DEM.	IND.
	%	%	%	%
Should do more to protect morality	41	53	34	37
Getting too involved in morality	51	41	60	54
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	8	6	6	9
	100	100	100	100

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

On the broad question of the government's role in upholding morals, about half of all Americans — 51% — agreed with the statement "I worry the government is getting too involved in the issue of morality," while 41% favored the government doing more in this area.


Republicans were more supportive than Democrats of greater government involvement in protecting morals. Still, Republicans were somewhat ambivalent — 53% believed the government should do more to protect morality while 41% said they worry that the government is getting too involved in morality.

Government OK with GOP

Americans have long been conflicted in their overall views of government and politicians. At times, the public has swung toward a harshly critical stance — as in the mid-1990s, when anti-government sentiment surged. But in the wake of September 11, support for government rebounded as Americans looked to Washington for protection.


Pew's December 2004 survey on political values found moderation in the public's attitudes toward government. Nearly half of all Americans — 45% — thought government does a better job than it gets credit for; about the same number (47%) said that government is almost always "wasteful and inefficient." There was a similar split over the efficacy of government regulation — 49% believed it is necessary to protect the public interest, while 41% said it does more harm than good.

Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

Elected officials in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

But Democrats and Republicans no longer differ on these questions as they did through the 1990s. As recently as 1999, there were gaps of about 20 percentage points between the parties on both of these values; and throughout the 1990s, responses to these questions were important predictors of voting preference.

Those differences have now narrowed or vanished, and the change has been largely driven by growing pro-government sentiment among Republicans. This no doubt has much to do with the fact Republicans now control both the White House and Congress. Even so, the GOP's increasing comfort with government represents a major shift from the days of the Republican revolution.

Politicians have long had a negative image with the public. Two thirds of Americans (66%) said in the December 2004 survey that elected officials in Washington lose touch with people pretty quickly, and 63% felt that elected officials generally "don't care what people like me think." These numbers actually represent modest improvement since the mid-1990s.

Reflecting their parties' contrasting political fortunes over the past decade, Republicans have become much less critical of Washington politicians, while Democrats have become somewhat more negative. In July 1994, 73% of Republicans said that elected officials tend to lose touch quickly; ten years later, 55% felt this way. By comparison, the number of Democrats taking this position grew from 66% in July 1994 to 72% last year.

Debating Immigration's Impact

The values survey showed the public is evenly divided on the impact that immigrants are having on American culture and the economy. It also found no evidence that concerns about terrorism and homeland security have led to significantly more negative views of immigrants.

About as many people said immigrants strengthen the U.S. because of their hard work and talents as said they are a burden because of the impact on jobs, schools, health care and the like. Views of immigrants were a bit less positive than in 2000, during the economic boom, but much more favorable than in the mid-1990s. In 1994, the public by two to one saw immigrants as burdening the U.S. rather than strengthening it.

Americans also disagreed about whether immigrants, on balance, strengthen American culture (50% said this) or threaten it (40%). Hispanics were far more positive about immigrants than are whites or African-Americans.

Split Over Social Safety Net

Over the past decade, there has been a significant rise in empathy for the poor, as well as growing support for more government assistance for the poor and needy. About half of Americans subscribe to the view that poor people have hard lives because government benefits do not go far enough; only about a third think that the poor have it easy because they receive government benefits. That represents a major shift since the mid-1990s, when narrow majorities felt poor people had easy lives.

Opinions about Immigrants

	TOTAL
IMMIGRANTS...	%
... Strengthen our country through their hard work and talents	45
... Are a burden because they take our jobs, housing and health care	44
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	11
	100
NEWCOMERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES ...	
... Threaten traditional American customs and values	40
... Strengthen American society	50
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	10
	100


Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

Partisan Divide on Needs of Poor

	TOTAL	PARTY ID		
		REP	DEM	IND
	%	%	%	%
Poor people have it easy	34	50	24	29
Poor people have hard lives	52	36	64	57
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	14	14	12	14
	100	100	100	100
Govt. should do more to help the needy	57	46	68	58
Govt. can't afford more help for the needy	33	45	25	31
Neither/both/don't know (vol.)	10	9	7	11
	100	100	100	100

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2004

Government should do more for the poor, even if it means going deeper into debt



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

In the wake of welfare reform and tighter economic times, the public also has grown more supportive of increased assistance to poor and needy people. Over the past decade or so, the number favoring more aid for needy people has increased from about 50% to 57%.

Attitudes toward the social safety net remain highly partisan, but there have been major shifts on these measures among members of both parties over the past decade. In July 1994, nearly two thirds of Republicans said that poor people have easy lives; late last year, half of all Republicans expressed that view. Over the same period, the number of Democrats who believe that the poor have it easy has dropped from 44% to 24%.

A decade ago, 61% of Republicans felt that the government could not afford to do more to help the poor. In the 2004 values survey, as many Republicans said the government should do more to help the poor, even if it means going deeper into debt, as felt that the government cannot afford greater aid to the poor. The number of Democrats favoring increased aid to the poor also rose – from 59% to 68%.

The **Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life** delivers timely, impartial information to national opinion leaders on issues at the intersection of religion and public affairs; it also serves as a neutral venue for discussions of these matters.

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A Faith-Based Partisan Divide

The United States has a long tradition of separating church from state, but an equally powerful inclination to mix religion with politics. Throughout our nation's history, great political and social movements — from abolition to women's suffrage to civil rights to today's struggles over abortion and gay marriage — have drawn upon religious institutions for moral authority, inspirational leadership and organizational muscle. But for the past generation, religion has come to be woven more deeply into the fabric of partisan politics than ever before.

The 2004 election was the latest in a string of modern presidential campaigns in which candidates openly discussed their religious beliefs, churches were increasingly active in political mobilization, and voters sorted themselves out not just by their policy preferences and demographic traits but also by the depth of their religious commitment. In fact, whether a person regularly attends church (or synagogue or mosque) was more important in determining his or her vote for president than such demographic characteristics as gender, age, income and region, and just as important as race. This chapter tracks and analyzes these underlying trends.

The Church Attendance Gap

By far the most powerful new reality at the intersection of religion and politics is this: Americans who regularly attend worship services and hold traditional religious views increasingly vote Republican, while those who are less connected to religious institutions and more secular in their outlook tend to vote Democratic. This is becoming such a familiar dividing line in modern politics that it is easy to overlook how unusual it is from a historical perspective for a majority of the most religiously engaged voters to gravitate toward one party while a majority of the most secular gravitate toward the other.


Journalists and pundits have taken to calling this phenomenon the “God Gap” or the “God Gulf.” Although catchy, these terms are misnomers, since the vast majority of support for Democratic as well as Republican candidates comes from people who believe in God and consider themselves religious. What has occurred in recent elections is better described as a “church attendance gap” because it is closely tied to levels of religious engagement, notably church (or synagogue or mosque) attendance and theological orthodoxy.

This divide was very much in evidence in the 2004 presidential election. Voters who attend church more than once a week (an estimated 16% of the electorate) supported President George W. Bush over Sen. John Kerry by a margin of 64% to 35%, according to the National Election Pool, the exit poll that was conducted for a consortium of major news organizations. Among those attending a house of worship once a week (26% of all voters), the margin was 58% to 41% in Bush’s favor. The candidates were virtually dead even (Bush 50%, Kerry 49%) among monthly church attendees (14% of the electorate), and among the 28% of voters who attend church a few times a year, Kerry had the advantage by a margin of 54% to 45%. The senator’s lead was widest among the estimated 15% of the electorate that never attends worship services; Kerry pulled 62% of that group, compared with 36% for Bush.

“Americans who regularly attend worship services and hold traditional religious views increasingly vote Republican, while those who are less connected to religious institutions and more secular in their outlook tend to vote Democratic.”

The Religious Divide in the 2004 Election

Voters who attend church regularly (at least once a month) were more likely to vote for President Bush, while those who seldom or never attend religious services voted heavily Democratic.



Source: National Election Pool

The correlation between church attendance and voting preference is not the only way to look at this divide. One can also analyze political preferences through the lens of religious orthodoxy, as we did in a spring 2004 “American Religious Landscape and Politics Survey,” sponsored by the Pew Forum and conducted by Prof. John Green of the University of Akron. This survey took the nation’s three largest faith traditions — White Evangelical Protestant, White Roman Catholic and Mainline Protestant — and subdivided each into three subgroups: traditionalists, centrists and modernists. Traditionalists are those with the most orthodox theological beliefs within their respective traditions (based, for example, on their interpretation of the Bible or church doctrine) as well as the highest level of religious engagement. They also tend to take conservative stands on a host of cultural and public policy issues, from abortion to gay marriage. Modernists, on the other hand, are the least orthodox in belief and least involved with religious institutions. They also tend to be liberal on most policy issues. Centrists are somewhere in between, both in terms of level of religious engagement and political orientation.

This more nuanced breakdown generates much the same pattern in partisan affiliation and policy outlook as does the church attendance gap. Together, both analyses affirm that the important political fault lines in the American religious landscape do not run along denominational lines, but cut across them. That is, they are defined by religious outlook rather than denominational labels. For instance, traditionalist Catholics are closer to traditionalist Evangelicals than to modernist Catholics in their views on issues such as abortion or embryonic stem cell research. The survey also found that traditionalists in all three major faith groups overwhelmingly identify with the Republican Party – and that traditionalist Evangelicals do so by a 70% to 20% margin. The margins among Mainline Protestant and Catholic traditionalists are less lopsided but nonetheless solidly Republican. On the other side of the divide, modernists in all these religious traditions as well as secularists strongly favor the Democrats. Modernist Mainline Protestants, for example, now favor the Democrats by a more than two-to-one margin.

A Different Kind of Divide

Even though the evidence for a religion divide is compelling, it is important to note that the bulk of membership in both parties is made up of people of faith. Moreover, while the correlation between holding conservative religious beliefs and voting for conservative candidates is strong, it is not universal. For example, African Americans and Latinos generally hold traditionalist religious views. Yet African Americans identify with the Democratic Party by a margin of more than seven to one, and in 2004 supported Kerry by nearly nine to one. Latinos are not as strongly tied to the Democrats; in

Partisan Affiliation by Major Religious Groups

Traditionalists, whether Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, or Catholic, are more likely to be Republicans, while those who are eager to adapt their faith to modern beliefs or who are secular in their outlook are more likely to be Democratic.

MAJORITY REPUBLICAN (%)			
Traditionalist Evangelical	70	10	20
Traditionalist Mainline	59	10	31
Traditionalist Catholic	57	13	30
Evangelical (all)	56	17	27
PLURALITY REPUBLICAN (%)			
Centrist Evangelical	48	22	30
Centrist Mainline	47	20	33
Mainline Protestant (all)	44	18	38
Other Christians	42	36	22
PLURALITY DEMOCRATIC (%)			
Catholic (all)	41	15	44
ENTIRE SAMPLE	38	20	42
Unaffiliated believers	28	37	35
Unaffiliated	27	30	43
Latino Protestants	37	20	43
Modernist Evangelical	32	24	44
Seculars	29	27	44
Centrist Catholic	35	19	46
MAJORITY DEMOCRATIC (%)			
Modernist Catholic	37	11	52
Atheist, agnostic	19	27	54
Other faiths	12	33	55
Modernist Mainline	23	21	56
Latino Catholic	15	24	61
Jewish	21	11	68
Black Protestants	11	18	71

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute, University of Akron, March-May 2004. Answers based on replies from all adults. Note: "Democratic" and "Republican" includes those who indicated they were leaning to the party in question.

2004, according to estimates from the exit polls, President Bush captured between 40% and 44% of the Latino vote. Still, this is another bloc that is traditionalist in its religious outlook and Democratic in its voting habits. Clearly, then, the behavior of these and other voting blocs is influenced by a range of factors, including race, gender, socioeconomic status and region. Level of religious engagement is just one of many determinants. But where does it stand in the hierarchy?

Religion's Role in Presidential Voting

By doing a multiple regression analysis of exit poll and other public opinion survey data from 2004 and 2000, we have assigned a relative weight to the impact that a number of demographic markers had on a person's vote for president. As the table below indicates, church attendance tied with race as the single most important influence in 2004; it also far outstripped other individual demographic characteristics such as gender or income. Church attendance was more important in 2004 than it had been in 2000. And even though race and religion had a similar statistical impact in 2004, the overall importance of religion in last year's vote was arguably greater. That is because the impact of race on voter choice is almost entirely a function of the high level of support that African Americans — 12.3% of the total population — give to Democrats. But the relationship between church attendance and vote choice is seen across the full range of the population.

Relative Importance of Religious Engagement in Presidential Vote, 2004 and 2000

	INDEX OF IMPACT*	
	2000 ^a	2004 ^b
Church attendance	22	28
Race	28	28
Union household	11	15
Urban/rural	11	11
Income	08	09
South/non-South	09	08
Age	05	07
Gender	17	07
Education	04	05

* Index based on standardized regression coefficients computed in a multiple regression analysis predicting Democratic vs. Republican vote from demographic characteristics and church attendance.

^a Data from VNS Exit Poll

^b Data from PRC Election Weekend Poll

The Polarizing Issue Agenda

The most important cause of this new church attendance gap is the mix of social and cultural issues that have come to the fore in the modern era. The so-called moral issues — prayer in school, abortion, homosexuality, gay marriage — have tended to push the religiously observant into one political corner and the more secular into the other. These differences over specific policy issues are amplified and exacerbated by a more general division over the popular culture, as more religiously observant Americans have come to decry what they see as the morally decadent influence of movies, songs, music videos, television programs, video games and the like. In a July 2003 Pew poll, Hollywood was seen as more hostile to religion than any other group tested, including the news media and academia. Not surprisingly, the perception that Hollywood is unfriendly toward religion is even greater among those who are religious. While 45% of the general population say Hollywood is hostile to religion, nearly six in ten of those who are strongly religious feel this way.

How the Public Rates Institutions' Attitudes Toward Religion

	FRIENDLY	NEUTRAL	UNFRIENDLY	DON'T KNOW/REFUSED
	%	%	%	%
Republican Party	52	27	10	11
Conservatives	51	25	10	14
Democratic Party	42	36	12	10
Liberals	26	33	27	14
Professors	18	40	26	16
News media	16	41	34	9
Hollywood	16	31	45	8

Source: *Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus*, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, July 2003. Answers based on replies from all adults.

The current fight over gay marriage is the most recent example of the kind of religious and political tensions that flow from these cultural wedge issues. The question of whether homosexuals should be allowed to marry came to the fore in the fall of 2003, after the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that denying same-sex marriage violated that state's constitution and several cities and towns, including San Francisco, began granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The issue found its way into the 2004 presidential campaign when President Bush endorsed a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would define marriage as the union of a man and a woman.

Polls show that nearly six in ten Americans oppose gay marriage. But a breakdown of these numbers by level of religious engagement more clearly underscores the fissures created by this issue. Among those with a high level of religious commitment, fully 80% oppose same-sex matrimony. Among those with average levels of religious commitment, the opposition drops to 57%, and among those with a low level of religious commitment, it drops further to 39%.

A similar dynamic is at work in the debate over embryonic stem cell research, another issue that attracted attention in the 2004 campaign. The paramount issue for some people is what they see as the destruction of life in its embryonic form. Others put more emphasis on the possibility that stem cell research could lead to cures for debilitating diseases. While 52% of all American adults favor embryonic stem cell research, the level of support drops to 34% among those with a high level of religious commitment, and it rises to 66% among those with a low level of religious commitment.

Opposition to Gay Marriage is Higher Among the Faithful

	LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT		
	HIGH	AVERAGE	LOW
	%	%	%
Favor	12	35	50
Oppose	80	57	39
Don't know	8	8	11

Source: *Republicans Unified, Democrats Split on Gay Marriage*, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, November 2003 (data: October 2003). Answers based on replies from all adults.

Different Views on Stem Cell Research


MORE IMPORTANT TO CONDUCT RESEARCH	2002	2004	INCREASE, '02-'04
	%	%	
TOTAL	43	52	9
18-29	46	54	8
30-49	46	55	9
50-64	40	52	12
65+	34	44	10
College graduate	55	61	6
Some college	46	50	4
High school graduate	34	49	15
Less than H.S. grad.	36	47	11
White Protestant	38	48	10
Evangelical	26	33	7
Mainline	51	66	14
White Catholic	43	55	12
Secular	66	68	2
LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT*			
High	21	34	13
Moderate	40	55	15
Low	61	66	5
POLITICAL ORIENTATION			
Conservative Republican	32	35	3
Moderate/Liberal Republican	48	54	6
Independent	49	57	8
Conservative/Mod Democrat	43	58	15
Liberal Democrat	55	72	17

*Combination of religious attendance and importance of religion

Source: *GOP the Religion-Friendly Party, But Stem-Cell Issue May Help Democrats*, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, August 2004. Answers based on replies from all adults.


Evangelicals and Party Identification, 1960-2004

% PARTY IDENTIFICATION



Catholics and Party Identification, 1960-2004

% PARTY IDENTIFICATION



Source: National Election Studies, University of Michigan (for 1960-2000); Bliss Institute (2004)
 Note: "Democratic" and "Republican" includes those who indicated they were leaning to the party in question.

Changing Political Demographics

Historically, religious fissures in the political arena have tended to break along denominational lines rather than by level of religious commitment. Throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries, tensions between Protestants and Catholics often took on a partisan cast. During the 1930s, for example, New Deal Democrats overwhelmingly won the support of Catholics, as well as white and black Protestants in the South. Republicans, on the other hand, drew the bulk of their support from white Protestants in the Northeast, Midwest and West. These patterns held until the 1960s, when a major realignment began to take place, prompted by a mix of racial and social issues that would come to define the "culture wars" of the ensuing decades. The civil rights movement was one key trigger. It sent Southern whites (of all faith traditions) over to the Republican column and helped solidify African-American support for the Democratic Party. Another trigger was a pair of U.S. Supreme Court decisions: the 1962 decision that banned organized prayer in public schools, and the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision that guaranteed the right to an abortion. Those rulings generated a backlash among religious conservatives that reverberates to this day. For the past generation, the Republican Party has become the standard-bearer of a social conservative agenda and the natural home for those who are traditionalist in their religious views. In particular, the GOP has embraced the antiabortion movement, making it a central pillar of the party's platform.

These developments produced significant political shifts among the nation's major faith traditions. White Evangelicals, who had strongly favored Democrats in 1960 (by a two-to-one margin) are now securely in the GOP camp. According to the Religious Landscape survey, Evangelicals now identify themselves as Republican by a 56% to 27% margin. Moreover, the 2004 exit poll showed that a whopping 78% of white Evangelicals voted for President Bush, and that they comprised 23% of the overall electorate, making them by far the single most potent voting bloc in the electorate last year.

Roman Catholics have also shifted party allegiances, although not quite as dramatically as Evangelicals. In 1960, 71% of Catholics identified themselves as Democratic or leaning Democratic. By 2004, that number had dropped to 44%, with 41% favoring the GOP. Much of this change took place in the 1970s and '80s, years when Catholics made up a substantial portion of so-called "Reagan Democrats" who were conservative on moral issues and drawn to President Reagan's emphasis on traditional values and patriotism.


While Democrats have been hurt by these changes, they have benefited from other ideological shifts within faith traditions. For instance, Democratic support from Black Protestants has gone up sharply, rising from 50% in 1960 to more than 70% today. Meanwhile, Mainline Protestants, once the religious foundation of the GOP, have been trending away from the Republicans, dropping from 52% in 1960 to 44% today. Democrats have also picked up support in the Jewish community. In the last 12 years, according to the Religious Landscape survey, the number of Jews who identify themselves as Democrats has jumped from 45% to 68%. In 2004, however, President Bush bucked that trend a bit. Exit polls show he picked up 25% of the Jewish vote, up from the 19% he had received four years earlier.

All of these political shifts among religious denominations have coincided with related regional changes. The movement of Evangelicals to the Republican Party, for example, is part of a broader shift to the GOP among white voters in the Evangelical-heavy South. Today, Republicans dominate the region in much the same way Democrats did until a generation ago. Likewise, parts of the Northeast and West that were once reliably Republican now favor Democratic candidates.

These changes have created a partisan landscape that is more ideologically and geographically coherent — and more conducive to sorting out supporters by degree of religious engagement rather than by denomination. These new patterns are born out by the Religious Landscape survey, which shows that the GOP-dominated South and Midwest have higher rates of church attendance than do the Democratic-dominated Northeast and West.

Mainline Protestants and Party Identification, 1960-2004

% PARTY IDENTIFICATION




Source: National Election Studies, University of Michigan (for 1960-2000); Bliss Institute, University of Akron (2004)
 Note: "Democratic" and "Republican" includes those who indicated they were leaning to the party in question.

Worship Attendance by Region

	NORTHEAST	MIDWEST	WEST	SOUTH	ALL
Once a week or more	14%	16%	13%	23%	17%
Once a week	27%	30%	23%	24%	26%
Once or twice a month	12%	16%	15%	19%	16%
A few times a year	19%	15%	17%	15%	16%
Seldom	17%	13%	16%	11%	14%
Never	11%	10%	16%	8%	11%

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute, University of Akron, March-May 2004. Answers based on replies from all adults.

Presidents Should Have Strong Religious Beliefs



Source: *GOP the Religion-Friendly Party, But Stem-Cell Issue May Help Democrats*, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, August 2004. Answers based on registered voters.

Politicians Mention Their Own Faith and Religion...

	2003			2004		
	TOO MUCH	TOO LITTLE	RIGHT AMOUNT	TOO MUCH	TOO LITTLE	RIGHT AMOUNT
Total	21%	41%	29%	27%	31%	32%
White	21%	38%	32%	26%	29%	36%
Evangel. Prot.	6%	64%	26%	11%	50%	32%
Mainline Prot.	22%	23%	44%	27%	22%	39%
Catholic	20%	37%	35%	30%	16%	47%
Black	18%	62%	14%	22%	43%	19%
Hispanic	18%	46%	23%	29%	40%	21%

Source: *GOP the Religion-Friendly Party, But Stem-Cell Issue May Help Democrats*, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, August 2004. Answers based on replies from all adults.

Should Churches Express Views on Political Matters?

	SHOULD	SHOULD KEEP OUT	DON'T KNOW
Total	52	44	4
18-29	59	36	5
30-49	55	41	4
50-64	49	47	4
65+	38	54	8
White	50	46	4
Evangelical	68	27	5
High commitment	73	23	4
Less commitment	59	36	5
Mainline	43	53	4
Catholic	46	51	3
Black	66	30	4
Protestant	72	24	4
Hispanic	53	40	7
Catholic	55	42	3

Source: *Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus*, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, July 2003. Answers based on replies from all adults.

Increased Acceptance of Religion in the Public Square

Polls show that most Americans strongly believe that state and church should keep a healthy distance. But this conviction coexists with an equally strong belief that religion should have a substantial presence in American public life. According to the August 2004 Pew survey, more than seven in ten Americans want their president to have strong religious beliefs. In the same poll, only about a quarter of voters said that politicians “mention religious faith and prayer too much,” a finding that should be judged in the context of two successive presidential campaigns in which both major party candidates frequently discussed the role of religion in their lives (sometimes on their own initiative, often in response to queries from citizens or journalists).

Voters even accept a limited role for churches in the political process. According to the July 2003 Pew Survey, 52% of Americans agree that churches should express views on political matters. Not surprisingly, support for political involvement is highest among Evangelicals and Black Protestants — the two faith groups where the churches tend to be the most politically active. Interestingly, as the table shows, young voters favor church involvement in politics more enthusiastically than do their older counterparts.

That matters of faith and politics often intersect is not surprising given the highly religious nature of this country. Six out of ten Americans say religion is very important to them, and more than four in ten report they attend a house of worship at least once a week. At the same time, however, there are lines that most Americans do not want religious institutions to cross. For instance, the August 2004 Pew survey found that a solid majority (65%) of people believe churches should not endorse political candidates. Even among the very religious, 61% oppose candidate endorsements. Strong opposition to candidate endorsement extends even to indirect but related actions, such as the announcement by a number of Roman Catholic bishops during the 2004 presidential campaign that they would deny communion to Kerry and other Catholic politicians who supported abortion rights. According to the August poll, 64% of Americans believed that those bishops were acting improperly. Interestingly, opposition was particularly strong among Roman Catholics.


The 2004 Election and the Evangelical Vote

The 2004 campaign showed once again that White Evangelicals are by far the most important component of the GOP coalition. This group makes up nearly a quarter of the electorate and votes Republican by increasingly lopsided margins. The president garnered 78% of all White Evangelical votes in 2004, a 10 percentage point increase over what he received four years earlier.


Bush made less dramatic but still significant gains among most other religious groups. He took a majority of the Roman Catholic vote, and that against a Roman Catholic challenger

Churches, Politics and Government

VIEW ON WHETHER CHURCHES SHOULD ENDORSE POLITICAL CANDIDATES



Is It Proper for Catholic Leaders to Deny Communion to Politicians?



Source: *GOP the Religion-Friendly Party, But Stem-Cell Issue May Help Democrats*, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, August 2004. Answers based on replies from all adults.

— garnering 52% of their support, 5 percentage points more than his share in 2000. This increase was due in part to his strong showing among Catholics who attend Mass regularly. These Catholics, who gave Bush 56% of their vote, were more likely to agree with the church's opposition to gay marriage, abortion and embryonic stem cell research, and hence lined up more closely with the president's positions on these issues. But Bush also did better in 2004 than he did in 2000 among less observant Catholics, garnering 49% of their vote last year, compared with 42% four years earlier.

Bush likewise gained ground among Black Protestants (up 6 percentage points), although his share of that strongly Democratic constituency was still only 13%. The issue of gay marriage appears to have helped the president with this group, which overwhelmingly opposes extending legal recognition to such unions. With Jews, another reliable Democratic constituency, the president increased his share by 6 percentage points and did especially well among the Orthodox Jews and Jews who attend synagogue regularly. He even managed to gain ground among secular voters, winning 31% of their vote, or one percentage point more than he did in 2000. In sum, Bush did considerably better in 2004 among the religious than among the less religious, but between 2000 and 2004, he actually made bigger gains among those who seldom if ever attend church than he did among the religiously observant.

Presidential Vote by Religion, 2000-2004

	2000 VNS EXIT POLL		2004 NEP EXIT POLL		BUSH GAIN
	BUSH %	GORE %	BUSH %	KERRY %	
Total	48	48	51	48	3
Protestant (all)	56	42	59	40	3
White Protestant	62	35	67	33	5
Evangelical	68	30	78	21	10
Mainline	53	43	55	45	2
Catholic (all)	47	50	52	47	5
White, non-Hisp. Catholic	52	45	56	43	4
Hispanic Catholic	33	65	39	58	6
Black Protestant	7	91	13	86	6
Jewish	19	79	25	74	6
Other religion	28	62	23	74	-5
Secular	30	61	31	67	1
Protestant					
Attend weekly or more	64	34	66	33	2
Attend less often	48	49	52	47	4
Catholic					
Attend weekly or more	53	44	56	43	3
Attend less often	42	54	49	50	7

Notes: Division between Evangelical and Mainline Protestants in 2000 established from Pew pre-election poll. All other estimates based on Voter News Service (VNS) and National Election Pool (NEP) exit polls. Hispanics included in designation of White Protestants; exit poll figures adjusted to fit this description.

Church Attendance and the Presidential Vote, 2000-2004

	2000 VNS EXIT POLL		2004 NEP EXIT POLL		BUSH GAIN
	BUSH %	GORE %	BUSH %	KERRY %	
More than once a week	63	36	64	35	1
Once a week	57	40	58	41	1
Monthly	46	51	50	49	4
A few times a year	42	54	45	54	3
Never	32	61	36	62	4

Source: *Religion and the Presidential Vote*, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Dec. 6, 2004. Answers based on replies from adults. 2000 data from VNS; 2004 data from NEP.

Profiles of Religious Groups

The tables on the next few pages present a political and demographic profile of major religious groups in the United States, with comparisons with the population as a whole. The groups are divided according to adherence to religious tradition (for example, Roman Catholic, Mainline Protestant or Jewish); some of the larger groups are also divided by religious commitment, as measured by attendance at religious services. Data for this analysis are drawn from two sources. Demographic

characteristics and party identification are based on a compilation of Pew Research Center surveys conducted between January and August 2004 with a total sample size of 16,046. Political values were measured in two large Pew Research Center surveys conducted in July 2002 and July 2003. These tables are based on surveys of all adult Americans; some of the tables earlier in this chapter are based on surveys of voters. For this reason, there are some differences between the two sets of tables.

The only religious category where the president lost ground between 2000 and 2004 was among those who identified themselves as “other religion,” a catch-all category that includes Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus. Bush won 23% of this group, or 5 percentage points less than he had received in the previous presidential election. This loss of support is due at least in part to the president’s rising unpopularity among American Muslims. Although a plurality of Muslims supported Bush over Gore in 2000, many have become disillusioned with the administration’s support for the Patriot Act and other domestic security steps taken in the wake of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

But groups that comprise the “other religions” category make up only 7% of the electorate, not enough to significantly mitigate the president’s gains among other denominations. In both 2000 and 2004, the church attendance gap was an important element in President Bush’s victories. Whether it persists and continues to favor Republicans is likely to be one of the most important political stories of the coming decades.

How the Major U.S Religious Groups Compare on Demographics

	TOTAL	COMMITTED* WHITE EVANG. PROTESTANTS	OTHER* WHITE EVANG. PROTESTANTS	COMMITTED WHITE MAINLINE PROTESTANTS	OTHER WHITE MAINLINE PROTESTANTS	COMMITTED BLACK PROTESTANTS	OTHER BLACK PROTESTANTS
UNWEIGHTED N	20,587	3,000	1,578	1,166	3,281	937	643
Total	100%	13.6%	8.1%	4.9%	15.0%	4.7%	3.6%
Male	48	42	46	38	52	36	50
Female	52	58	54	62	48	64	50
18-29	21	13	15	14	17	20	30
30-49	39	35	41	32	39	40	42
50-64	22	26	25	23	25	23	19
65+	16	25	18	30	18	15	8
Less than high school	13	13	20	10	12	21	25
High school graduate	32	34	38	27	33	31	36
Some college	28	27	28	28	28	29	25
College graduate	26	25	14	36	27	19	14
Hispanic	11	5	5	5	4	4	6
Inc. less than \$20,000	18	17	22	14	15	28	36
\$20,000 to \$29,999	12	11	16	11	12	15	19
\$30,000 to \$49,999	22	24	23	19	23	21	19
\$50,000 to \$74,999	15	17	15	15	16	11	8
\$75,000+	21	17	14	26	23	12	9
Married	53	66	55	62	56	39	28
Divorced	12	10	16	9	14	15	14
Separated	2	2	3	1	2	5	6
Widowed	9	13	11	14	8	11	8
Never been married	24	10	15	14	20	31	43
Labor Household	13	11	13	13	14	16	12
East	20	10	9	16	18	11	18
Midwest	23	24	26	30	29	18	20
South	35	51	47	38	32	62	52
West	22	15	18	16	21	9	10
Large city	21	12	14	14	16	38	40
Suburb	23	19	16	24	23	18	17
Small city or town	36	39	41	40	36	33	32
Rural area	19	29	27	21	24	9	8
Voter registration							
Yes, certain	74	84	71	83	75	77	68
Not certain	26	16	29	17	25	23	32

* Note: "Committed" defined as attending church weekly or more often. "Other" defined as attending church less than weekly or not at all. Demographic items, party identification, interest in government, and opinion on Iraq based on Pew surveys conducted January 2004 to October 2004. Other values questions based on Pew surveys conducted July 2002 and July 2003.

COMMITTED NON-HISP. CATHOLICS	OTHER NON-HISP. CATHOLICS	HISPANIC CATHOLICS	JEWS	MORMONS	MUSLIMS	EASTERN ORTHODOX	SECULARS	OTHER RELIGION
1,757	2,166	904	513	417	114	153	2,589	751
7.5%	10.5%	6.9%	2.0%	2.0%	0.6%	0.7%	13.1%	3.8%
42	51	45	49	51	66	53	59	53
58	49	55	51	49	34	47	41	47
10	19	35	17	28	32	18	36	28
34	46	43	35	36	56	50	40	45
25	23	15	26	22	8	14	17	21
30	11	7	22	13	1	15	6	6
8	10	18	4	9	11	6	12	12
32	33	34	16	27	33	23	29	24
26	32	29	27	38	26	23	29	29
34	25	19	53	26	29	48	30	34
0	0	100	2	4	11	7	10	8
14	13	22	9	16	19	12	17	21
9	10	15	4	12	11	10	12	13
19	23	26	13	25	30	15	21	20
15	16	13	14	20	10	15	15	14
26	28	17	40	17	16	38	22	19
60	52	48	53	63	52	57	40	45
9	15	11	11	9	6	10	13	13
1	2	4	1	2	4	0	3	3
15	6	4	11	6	2	8	3	5
15	25	33	24	21	35	25	40	33
15	18	14	11	9	15	13	11	13
34	37	16	44	3	31	38	21	17
30	26	9	11	7	23	19	21	20
24	20	32	24	16	25	24	26	30
12	16	43	22	73	22	18	33	33
18	18	37	35	20	38	20	24	25
28	32	19	38	23	21	32	24	21
37	32	34	20	43	37	34	35	33
16	17	9	5	13	3	12	16	19
87	74	64	84	75	56	67	64	67
13	26	36	16	25	44	33	36	33

How the Major U.S Religious Groups Compare on Political Attitudes

	TOTAL	COMMITTED* WHITE EVANG. PROTESTANTS	OTHER* WHITE EVANG. PROTESTANTS	COMMITTED WHITE MAINLINE PROTESTANTS	OTHER WHITE MAINLINE PROTESTANTS	COMMITTED BLACK PROTESTANTS	OTHER BLACK PROTESTANTS
Party							
Republican	29	55	38	38	31	5	7
Democrat	33	20	27	29	29	69	65
Independent	31	20	29	26	34	20	23
No preference	4	3	4	4	4	4	1
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Iraq							
Right decision	55	74	67	57	59	26	31
Wrong decision	38	19	27	37	34	62	59
Pres. vote choice							
Bush/leaning to Bush	45	74	57	54	48	10	6
Kerry/leaning to Kerry	45	20	35	38	43	77	82
Nader/leaning to Nader	4	2	2	2	4	3	3
Values (2002-2003)							
	100%	14.9%	8.3%	5.2%	16.7%	5.6%	4.0%
Unweighted N							
	4849	711	364	257	773	389	256
Govt. should help more needy people, even if it means more debt							
Agree	50	39	51	42	44	71	81
Disagree	45	56	45	52	52	26	15
Businesses make too much profit							
Agree	59	60	66	57	56	58	64
Disagree	35	33	28	32	40	36	29
Best way to ensure peace is through military strength							
Agree	59	64	72	65	63	49	51
Disagree	37	32	24	30	34	46	45
Discrimination against blacks is rare today							
Agree	31	37	32	33	31	24	30
Disagree	64	57	59	57	65	75	68
School boards should have right to fire gay teachers							
Agree	34	58	46	31	26	42	41
Disagree	61	36	47	60	70	55	54
Govt. regulation of business does more harm than good							
Agree	49	56	61	44	49	45	55
Disagree	42	38	31	44	44	49	35

* Note: "Committed" defined as attending church weekly or more often. "Other" defined as attending church less than weekly or not at all.
Demographic items, party identification, interest in government, and opinion on Iraq based on Pew surveys conducted January 2004 to October 2004.
Other values questions based on Pew surveys conducted July 2002 and July 2003.

COMMITTED NON-HISP. CATHOLICS	OTHER NON-HISP. CATHOLICS	HISPANIC CATHOLICS	JEWS	MORMONS*	MUSLIMS*	EASTERN ORTHODOX*	SECULARS	OTHER RELIGION
33	28	19	17	55	7	26	15	13
34	32	45	54	14	46	32	31	35
28	34	29	23	24	40	33	44	42
3	3	4	2	5	4	5	6	5
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
55	57	50	38	76	24	43	42	41
38	37	42	52	16	69	43	52	51
48	42	35	25	71			27	29
42	49	55	65	22			59	60
3	4	4	3	4			7	6
8.3%	11.9%	5.7%	1.8%				9.1%	4.3%
407	544	207	98				421	216
51	47	50	62				61	48
42	49	43	35				34	47
57	61	70	52				57	58
38	36	25	47				39	32
62	63	57	49				44	42
35	35	39	50				53	50
31	24	44	19				27	22
64	71	52	75				69	71
32	22	29	18				19	27
61	74	69	80				78	67
49	50	47	34				45	38
43	43	44	63				44	48

* Blank fields indicate insufficient data.

Media: More Voices, Less Credibility

This chapter is based on surveys taken by the **Pew Research Center for the People & the Press**, sometimes in concert with the Project for Excellence in Journalism, a Washington, D.C.-based research organization that will become a part of the Pew Research Center in 2006. The chapter was written by the staff of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.

3

Media

More Voices, Less Credibility

When the first President Bush ran for reelection in 1992, most Americans got their news from the broadcast networks, talk radio was about the only place one could go for hard-edged political discussion, and “the web” was a term associated mainly with spiders. A dozen years later, as the second President Bush begins his second term, the nation’s news universe has been completely transformed.

Changing demographics, lifestyles, business trends and, most of all, technologies have fundamentally altered the way we get the news. No single source today is nearly as dominant as network news was in the early 1990s. News consumers can choose from an expanding menu of options – print and electronic, network and cable, digital and analog. This has led to declining audiences for many traditional news sources and has changed the nature of competition among news outlets, from a set-piece battle among a handful of rivals to an all-out scramble for survival.

As the media landscape has shifted, so too have the public's news tastes and preferences. Sitting down with the news on a set schedule has become a thing of the past for many time-pressured Americans; instead, they graze on the news throughout the day. More people are turning away from traditional news outlets, with their decorous, just-the-facts aspirations to objectivity, toward noisier hybrid formats that aggressively fuse news with opinion or entertainment, or both. Young people, in particular, are bypassing mainstream sources in favor of alternatives they find on the internet or late-night television.

At the same time, public discontent with the news media has increased dramatically. Americans find the mainstream media much less credible than they did in the mid-1980s. They are even more critical of the way the press collects and reports the news. More ominously, the public also questions the news media's core values and morality. A short-lived upswing in the media's image in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, served only to cast these negative attitudes into sharp relief.

Today's vast array of news choices gives Americans an opportunity to do more than just vent their displeasure with the news media — they can also turn to news outlets that reflect their own ideology and political beliefs. The latest news consumption survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press showed a striking rise in the politicization of cable TV news audiences.

THE NEWS IN AMERICA

Changing Trends in News Consumption

	1993	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
REGULARLY WATCH ...	%	%	%	%	%	%
Local TV news	77	65	64	56	57	59
Nightly network news	60	42	38	30	32	34
Network TV magazines	52	36	37	31	24	22
Network morning news	—	—	23	20	22	22
Cable (in detail)						
Fox News Channel	—	—	17	17	22	25
CNN	35	26	23	21	25	22
MSNBC	—	—	8	11	15	11
CNBC	—	—	12	13	13	10
C-SPAN	11	6	4	4	5	5
Other sources						
Newspaper ¹	58	50	48	47	41	42
Radio ¹	47	44	49	43	41	40
Online news ²	—	2 ³	13	23	25	29

1 Figures based on use "yesterday," from Feb. 1994.

2 Online news at least three days per week

3 From June 1995

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, April-May 2004

This pattern is most apparent with the fast-growing Fox News Channel. Since 2000, Fox's audience has increased by nearly half, and much of that growth has come among Republicans and conservatives. At the same time, CNN, Fox's principal rival, has a more Democratic-leaning audience than in the past. Such sorting out by partisan affiliation is not occurring among readers of daily newspapers and viewers of network newscasts; those media sources have retained a broad audience mix that, while smaller than it used to be, still roughly matches the partisan leanings of the population as a whole.

However, opinions of the credibility of the news media, in all its forms, also have become more politically polarized. For years, the credibility ratings of mainstream news organizations have been in decline. Now this skepticism is taking on an increasingly partisan cast; Republicans give most news outlets far lower ratings for credibility than do Democrats.

Buffeted by rising public criticism and increasing competition, journalists are confronting something of a crisis of confidence. A survey last year by the Pew Research Center, in collaboration with the Project for Excellence in Journalism, found journalists voicing widespread dissatisfaction with the state of their profession, as growing majorities said that bottom-line pressures had undermined the quality of coverage.

There is evidence that these concerns are justified. The State of the News Media, a comprehensive report by the Project for Excellence in Journalism, showed that most sectors of the news media have experienced cutbacks in newsgathering resources in recent years. Radio newsroom staffing plummeted 57% between 1994 and 2001, and the number of network news correspondents has declined by more than a third since the mid-1980s.

This chapter looks at changes over the past two decades in how Americans get the news and what they think about the news.

Cable Audience More Politicized

	PUBLIC	REPUBLICAN	DEMOCRATIC	INDEPENDENT
REGULARLY WATCH ...	%	%	%	%
Fox News Channel	25	35	21	22
CNN	22	19	28	22
MSNBC	11	10	12	12
CNBC	10	9	12	9
NBC Nightly News	17	15	18	19
CBS Evening News	16	13	19	17
ABC World News	16	15	20	12
Newspaper ¹	42	45	46	39

¹ Figures based on use "yesterday."

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, April-May 2004

Gap in Most-Trusted News Sources*

REPUBLICANS	DEMOCRATS	INDEPENDENTS
Fox News (29)	CNN (45)	60 Minutes (29)
CNN (26)	60 Minutes (42)	CNN (28)
60 Minutes (25)	C-SPAN (36)	C-SPAN (26)
Wall St. Journal (23)	ABC News (34)	U.S. News (26)
C-SPAN (22)	CBS News (34)	NBC News (24)
Local TV news (21)	NPR (33)	NewsHour (24)

* Percent who believe all or most of what the organization reports, based on those able to rate the organization.

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, May 2004

“Sitting down with the news on a set schedule has become a thing of the past for many time-pressured Americans.”

News and Everyday Life

The public has less of a news habit than it did a decade ago. While the vast majority of Americans still get the news in some form on a daily basis, the percentage has declined, from 90% in 1994 to 82% last year. By contrast, other reported daily activities have remained stable.

The percentage of Americans who watch TV news on a typical day, read the newspaper or listen to radio news decreased significantly from 1994 to 2004. The number watching TV news on an average day fell from 72% in 1994 to 55% in 2002, before rebounding a bit in the latest survey.

The long-term decline in news consumption does not appear to be a consequence of rising dissatisfaction with the news media. Most Americans continue to say they enjoy keeping up with the news; in fact, somewhat more say that now than did so four years ago. But many people — especially young people — say they are too busy to follow the news.

Equally important, many people say they lack the informational background to keep up with the news. Fully 42% of Americans say they do not have the background to keep up with the news, a figure that rises to 50% among those with only a high school education.

News and Daily Life

	JAN. 1994	APRIL 1998	APRIL 2000	APRIL 2002	APRIL 2004
DID YESTERDAY	%	%	%	%	%
Watched TV news	72	59	56	55	60
Read newspaper	49	48	47	41	42
Listened to radio news	47	49	43	41	40
Any news yesterday ¹	90	85	83	80	82
Went online from home	—	17	23 ⁵	34	38
Went online from work ²	—	12	13 ⁵	20	20
Total online yesterday ²	4 ³	25	30 ⁵	43	47
Online news yesterday	—	—	—	—	24
Watched non-news TV	69	64 ⁴	57	59	63
Read a magazine	33	29	26	23	25
Read a book	31	35 ⁴	35 ⁶	34	35
Watched movie at home	—	—	—	23	24
Made personal phone call	63	67	—	63	66
E-mailed friend/relative	—	—	—	27	28
Ate family meal together	64	67	—	63	65
Prayed	56	—	—	66	66
Exercised/ran/sports	26	36	—	39	38
Shopped	23	30	—	27	28

1 For trending purposes, this measure includes only TV, newspaper and radio news sources.

2 Based on weekdays

3 From June 1995

4 From November 1997

5 From Pew Internet & American Life Project, April 2000

6 From September 1999

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

Young Adults' News Time Down Sharply Over Past Decade

	AVERAGE MINUTES "YESTERDAY"*						'94-'04 DIFF.
	JAN. 1994	APRIL 1996	APRIL 1998	APRIL 2000	APRIL 2002	APRIL 2004	
18-24	51	37	47	36	31	35	-16
25-29	62	53	50	50	48	45	-17
30-34	65	59	52	45	54	59	-6
35-49	74	64	62	57	57	66	-8
50-64	83	79	69	64	71	76	-7
65+	90	89	96	80	81	85	-5

* All averages are estimated, based on time spent watching TV news, reading newspapers and listening to news on the radio. Online news is not included.

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

Generational Divide in TV News

WATCH REGULARLY ...	18-29	30-49	50-64	65+	DIFF.*
NIGHTLY NETWORK NEWS	%	%	%	%	
2004	18	26	43	56	+38
2002	19	23	45	53	+34
CABLE TV NEWS					
2004	29	37	40	46	+17
2002	23	31	41	38	+15

* Represents the percentage point gap between the youngest and oldest viewers.

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

While other news sources struggle with diminished audiences, the internet has continued to grow. As many as half of all Americans go online from work or home on a typical day and about a quarter go online daily for news. In addition, online users who go online for other purposes — to shop, to email, or merely to browse the internet — are coming across the news inadvertently while they are online. Nearly three quarters of internet users get the news in this fashion, up from 55% in 1999.

Shifting Demographic Tides

More generally, there is evidence that the major events of recent years — from September 11 to the war in Iraq and the presidential election — have stemmed the decline in the public's news interest. Most Americans say they are spending more time with the news now than in 2000, though people are still devoting less time to the news than they did a decade ago.

But young people are conspicuous exceptions to this trend. Those ages 18 to 24 are not spending any more time with the news than they did in 2000 — despite the events of the last four years — and are spending much less time than they did a decade ago.

In that regard, traditional news outlets are confronting a potentially devastating demographic tide. Young people read newspapers and watch TV news — network and cable — at far lower rates than their elders. And the situation is not much better among the not so young. Just 26% of people in their 30s and 40s regularly tune in to the nightly network news, far below the number of older Americans who regularly watch network evening news.

Campaign News:

Broadcast Fading, Internet Rising

The 2004 presidential campaign provided a window on the continuing evolution in the public's news consumption. Television long has been the public's primary source for campaign news, and that remains the case today. But in the last four years alone, there have been significant changes in the composition of the TV news audience.

Pew's political news survey, conducted in January during the early stage of the campaign, showed that both local and network TV news lost considerable ground compared with 2000, while cable news made modest gains. Among several key demographic groups — young people, college graduates and wealthy Americans — cable emerged as the leading source for campaign news.

But a more important story from last year's campaign was the emergence of the internet as a major source of election news and information. The campaign news survey showed that online news had achieved parity with such traditional election news mainstays as public television broadcasts, Sunday morning news programs and weekly newsmagazines.

A Pew post-election survey confirmed the growing importance of the internet, even as it also showed a broader uptick in political news consumption. Compared with 2000, more voters said they relied on television, newspapers and radio as the main source for campaign news — reflecting the heightened interest in the 2004 campaign compared with the election of four years earlier.

Where Americans Learn About The Candidates and Campaign

	JAN. 2000	JAN. 2004	CHANGE
REGULARLY LEARN SOMETHING FROM ...	%	%	
Local TV news	48	42	-6
Cable news networks	34	38	+4
Nightly network news	45	35	-10
Daily newspaper	40	31	-9
TV newsmagazines	29	25	-4
Morning TV shows	18	20	+2
Talk radio	15	17	+2
Cable political talk	14	14	0
National Public Radio	12	14	+2
Sunday political TV	15	13	-2
Internet	9	13	+4
Public TV shows	12	11	-1
Web sites of news orgs.	—	11	—
Newsmagazines	15	10	-5
News pages of ISPs*	—	10	—
Late-night TV shows	9	9	0
C-SPAN	9	8	-1
Comedy TV shows	6	8	+2
Religious radio	7	5	-2
Online newsmagazines	—	2	—

* Internet service providers such as AOL and Yahoo

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2003-January 2004

How Did You Get Most of Your Election News?

	NOV. 1992	NOV. 1996	NOV. 2000	NOV. 2004
MAIN SOURCE OF CAMPAIGN NEWS*				
	%	%	%	%
Television	82	72	70	76
Newspapers	57	60	39	46
Radio	12	19	15	22
Magazines	9	11	4	6
Internet	n/a	3	11	21
GOT ANY CAMPAIGN NEWS FROM INTERNET				
Yes	—	10	30	41
No/don't know	—	90	70	59
		100	100	100

* Numbers add to more than 100% because voters could list up to two primary sources.
Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, post-election surveys of voters

Young People and Campaign News

AGES 18-29	JAN. 2000	JAN. 2004	CHANGE
REGULARLY LEARN SOMETHING FROM ...			
	%	%	
Cable news	38	37	-1
Local news	42	29	-13
TV newsmagazines	18	26	+8
Network news	39	23	-16
Daily newspaper	32	23	-9
Comedy TV shows	9	21	+12
Internet	13	20	+7
Morning TV shows	16	18	+2
Cable political talk	15	17	+2
Talk radio	16	16	0
Late-night TV shows	13	13	0
C-SPAN	12	11	-1
National Public Radio	12	11	-1
Sunday political TV	13	10	-3
Newsmagazines	15	9	-6
Public TV shows	11	7	-4
Religious radio	5	3	-2

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2003-January 2004

The internet's gains were relatively bigger than those of other media, with the number citing it as a main source of campaign news doubling between 2000 and 2004. More impressive, by the end of the campaign, 41% of voters said they got at least some campaign news from the internet — up fourfold from 1996.

The internet is not the only source that made notable gains among young people. The percentage of 18-to-29-year-olds who said they learned about the campaign from comedy shows such as *Saturday Night Live* and *The Daily Show* doubled between 2000 and 2004. For young people, programs like *The Daily Show* are now nearly as important sources of campaign news as network news and newspapers.

During the early Democratic primaries, *The Daily Show* achieved a symbolic milestone when ratings showed that more young men tuned into that late-night comedy show than to any of the three network evening news broadcasts.

Signs of Engagement


Despite the trend toward niche news and smaller news audiences, the major news stories of the past few years — September 11, the war in Iraq and the presidential election — have attracted considerable public interest. Moreover, there has been a notable increase in the percentage of Americans who say they follow international news closely most of the time, not just when important developments occur.

In 2004, a 52% majority said they follow overseas news most of the time, rather than only when major developments occur. That represents a significant change from surveys conducted in 1998, 2000 and 2002, when most Americans said they focused on overseas news only during times of crisis.

But nearly all of the increased interest in overseas news is attributable to the high levels of public attention to the war in Iraq and the war on terror. International news stories that do not directly affect Americans or the United States continue to draw little attention. The humanitarian crisis in Sudan, recent turmoil in Haiti and political instability in Venezuela are examples of significant stories that have failed to draw much public interest.


Interest in Foreign News Is Up Since 9/11 ...

AVERAGE PERCENT FOLLOWING FOREIGN NEWS STORIES "VERY CLOSELY"



... But It's Focused on Iraq and Terrorism

AVERAGE PERCENT FOLLOWING NEWS STORIES IN EACH CATEGORY "VERY CLOSELY"




Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, August 2004

“There has been a notable increase in the percentage of Americans who say they follow international news closely most of the time, not just when important developments occur.”

Mistrust of the Media Has Risen Sharply

PERCENT WHO SAY THEY BELIEVE LITTLE OR ALMOST NOTHING OF WHAT THEY SEE OR HEAR IN PRINT OR ON TV*



Note: Answers based on people who say they are able to rate the media.
Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, June 2004

* The words "little or" were added to this headline to more accurately describe the survey findings. [May 13, 2005]

The presidential campaign also attracted greater public attention than any election since 1992. This reflects the widely shared sense of the high stakes in the election. In June, 63% of Americans said it "really mattered" who won the election, while just 32% said things would not really change regardless of who won. That represented a dramatic change from the 2000 election. During the summer of 2000, just 45% of the public thought it really mattered who won the election.

Opinions of the News Media

If there is a bottom line in opinions about the press, it is believability. Trust is the lifeblood of the media's relationship with the people, and mainstream news organizations have seen their credibility ratings steadily erode over the past two decades. In 1985, only about one in seven Americans gave major news organizations low marks for credibility; now that proportion stands at roughly one in three, or even higher. This erosion of trust has affected virtually all news organizations, and has occurred among virtually all demographic groups.

The decline in credibility of daily newspapers is particularly striking. Two decades ago, just 16% of Americans said they could believe little or nothing of what they read in their daily paper; in the most recent survey, that number nearly tripled, to 45%.

As the credibility of leading news organizations has fallen, so too has overall confidence in the news media. Since the 1970s, the press has suffered much steeper declines in public confidence than have other major institutions.


The General Social Survey, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, has measured confidence in 13 institutions since 1973. For about the first decade of this survey, ratings for the press mirrored those of other major institutions. But in the 1980s, ratings for the press began to lag, and since 1990 they have been in a precipitous decline. In 1990, 74% of respondents said they had a great deal or some confidence in the press. By 2000 that number had dwindled to 58%. This has not been the case for other institutions tested in the nationwide NORC surveys.

Credibility Ratings More Partisan

In recent years, the news media's credibility crisis has been exacerbated by a growing partisan divide in how much people believe them. Pew's measures of trust in leading news outlets have consistently found some partisan differences in perceptions of credibility. But the gap is now wider than ever.

In a May 2004 survey, only about half as many Republicans as Democrats express a great deal of trust in the broadcast networks, National Public Radio, *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer* and top print outlets such as *The New York Times*, *Time* and *Newsweek*.

Americans Have a Great Deal of or Some Confidence in ...



This graph compares the percent saying they had "a great deal" or "some confidence" in the press vs. the mean average percentage saying they have a great deal of confidence in all other institutions tested. Included in that group are banks, companies, religion, education, the executive branch, labor, medicine, television, the Supreme Court, science, Congress and the military.
Source: General Social Survey

“In recent years, the news media’s credibility crisis has been exacerbated by a growing partisan divide in how much people believe them.”

Partisanship and Credibility*

	REP.	DEM.	GAP
BELIEVE ALL OR MOST OF WHAT THE ORGANIZATION SAYS	%	%	
Broadcast & cable outlets:			
CNN	26	45	+19
CBS News	15	34	+19
NPR	15	33	+18
NewsHour	12	30	+18
60 Minutes	25	42	+17
ABC News	17	34	+17
MSNBC	14	29	+15
C-SPAN	23	36	+13
NBC News	16	29	+13
Local TV news			
Fox News Channel	29	24	-5
Print Outlets:			
Associated Press	12	29	+17
New York Times	14	31	+17
Time	15	30	+15
Newsweek	12	26	+14
USA Today	14	25	+11
Daily newspaper	16	23	+7
Wall Street Journal	23	29	+6

* Percentages based on those who could rate each.

Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, June 2004


Four years ago, Republicans gave leading news outlets much higher marks for credibility. In nearly every case — with Fox News Channel a notable exception — those ratings have fallen significantly. Over the same period, credibility ratings among Democrats and independents have been much more stable.

Views of the Campaign

Pew's post-election survey showed that voters have become more critical of press coverage of the campaign. And while there are significant partisan differences here as well, increasing numbers in both parties — as well as independents — view the coverage as unfair.

Four in 10 voters said coverage of the Bush campaign was unfair, up from 30% four years ago. A smaller but growing minority also thought coverage of Kerry's campaign was unfair; 31% said that, compared with 24% who faulted the coverage of Al Gore's campaign in 2000.

Is the Press Unfair to Candidates?



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2004 post-election survey


Press Performance Criticized

On the most fundamental issues relating to press performance, from accuracy to a willingness to acknowledge mistakes, Americans judge the news media far more critically than they did a generation ago. And these negative perceptions generally cut across ideological and partisan lines.

In 1985, a solid majority (55%) believed that news organizations usually got the facts straight in their stories, while 34% disagreed. By 2003 these figures were reversed, as a 56% majority saw most reporting as inaccurate. The notable exception in this downward trend on this measure came in the fall of 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, when opinions of the news media and several other major institutions briefly improved.

When the press does make mistakes, most Americans believe that news organizations cover them up rather than come clean. In 2003, a 62% majority said news organizations try to cover up mistakes, up from 55% in 1985. Given these attitudes, it was probably not surprising that the 2003 scandal at *The New York Times* involving a reporter who fabricated news stories did not negatively affect public views of the press — the *Times* flap merely confirmed what many already suspected. Most Americans said that what occurred at the *Times* happens frequently, or at least occasionally, at all news organizations.

People Who Believe News Organizations Usually Get the Facts Straight




Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, July 2003

The public also thinks the news media lack compassion for the subjects of their stories. A majority of the public — 56% — believes news organizations do not care about the people they report on, up from 48% in 1985. Moreover, two thirds now say news organizations pay too much attention to bad news — an all-time high.

While Americans have become more critical of press practices, many also have lost respect for the basic values of the news media. The number saying the press is immoral, rather than moral, has more than doubled since the mid-1980s, from 13% to 32%. There has been a comparable rise in the percentage who view the press as unprofessional.

Press Is Politically Biased in Its Reporting



Source: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, July 2003

'Liberal' Charge Endures

Public cynicism about press values and performance also stem from growing perceptions of media bias and lack of fairness. In Pew's 2003 survey, two thirds (66%) said the press tends to favor one side when presenting the news, and seven in ten said news outlets are often influenced by powerful people and organizations. In 1985, barely half (53% each) expressed such negative opinions about media independence.

Most Americans (53%) also believe that news organizations are politically biased, while just 29% say they are careful to remove bias from their reports. There has been some movement in these attitudes in recent years — notably during the temporary upswing in the media's image following September 11 — but bias concerns are higher now than two decades ago.

When it comes to describing the press, twice as many say news organizations are "liberal" (51%) as say they are "conservative" (26%), while 14% say neither phrase applies. This was also the case in surveys conducted in the mid-to-late 1980s and, not surprisingly, there is a significant partisan cast to these perceptions.

Republicans see the press as more liberal than conservative by nearly three to one (65% to 22%). Among independents, the margin is two to one (50% to 25%). And while a third of Democrats say there is a conservative tilt to the American press, a slight plurality (41%) says the press is more liberal than anything else.

Last year's survey of journalists seemed to confirm many of the suspicions of those who see a liberal bias in the news. Most journalists characterized themselves as moderates, but as a group they are far more liberal — and far less conservative — than the general public. Just 7% of the national journalists surveyed called themselves conservatives, compared with 33% of the public. And while 34% of national journalists characterized themselves as liberals, just 20% of Americans describe themselves as liberals.

Journalists generally say they take it as their professional obligation not to let their own political and ideological leanings — liberal, moderate or conservative — shape their coverage. But the relatively small number of conservatives in journalism raises concerns over the potential for liberal group-think in the nation's newsrooms.

Watchdog Role Questioned

Despite the widespread criticism of the press on a number of fronts, the public continues to be largely supportive of the news media's role as a political watchdog. But at a time of war, an increasing number of Americans — particularly Republicans — have become less supportive of tough press scrutiny of the military.


In 2003, the public was divided over whether press criticism of the military keeps the nation prepared militarily or undermines the country's defenses. This marked a major shift in public opinion from the early 1990s. Shortly after the Persian Gulf War in 1991, 59% of the public said that press criticism of the military was a good thing. The change has come mostly from Republicans: In 1991, just 34% said press criticism of the military weakened defenses, but 12 years later that number had grown to 63%.

Criticism of Military Less Accepted

	JULY 1985	MAR 1991	NOV 2001	JULY 2002	JULY 2003
MEDIA CRITICISM OF THE MILITARY ...	%	%	%	%	%
Weakens defenses	31	28	37	40	43
Keeps nation prepared	51	59	49	49	45
Don't know	18	13	14	11	12
	100	100	100	100	100

Audience Ideology Profile

OF THOSE WHO REGULARLY WATCH, READ OR LISTEN TO THE FOLLOWING MEDIA, THIS IS THE PERCENTAGE WHO ARE ...



Source: Pew Center for the People & the Press, April-May 2001

Looking Forward: Greater Politicization?

Discontent with the press is as old as America itself and, in any era, some of the complaints about news organizations can be chalked up to a shoot-the-messenger syndrome — when Americans do not like what they hear or see in the news, the press becomes an easy target.

Today, however, the criticisms have taken on a harder political edge than in the recent past. And while the public's sources of information are more bountiful than ever, many are more partisan — from talk radio and cable news to opinionated blogs. The question now is whether the increasing political self-segregation of the cable news audience will extend to the audiences for other news media sources as well.

The evidence here is mixed. The core audiences for several news and opinion outlets such as *The O'Reilly Factor* and *Rush Limbaugh's* show are increasingly dominated by conservatives. But the audiences for many other major news organizations remain fairly balanced ideologically; indeed, their ideological composition generally reflects that of the general public. These include regular readers of newspapers and political magazines, and regular viewers of local news and morning news programs. In addition, the regular CNN audience does not stand out ideologically, although it is somewhat more Democratic than in the past.

As far as the internet is concerned, the "blogosphere" is awash in highly contentious opinion sites. A survey by the Pew Internet & American Life Project immediately after the 2004 election found that 9% of internet users had read political blogs "frequently" or "sometimes" during the campaign, suggesting that by the end of the year, blogs were a small but rapidly growing new medium for political information.

The public is still a long way from fully embracing "opinion news" — news that reflects one's own beliefs and preferences and tends to filter out dissenting views. This new hybrid — which is actually as old as the pamphleteers of the early days of American journalism — has gained a foothold in cable TV, talk radio and the internet, but has not spread more broadly throughout the media universe. And so a battle of sorts is raging within news organizations between the older norm of objectivity and the newer tug of opinion journalism. It's not clear which approach will prevail, or whether the two will coexist. One thing is certain: The fate of the news, as always, will rest with its audience.

The **Pew Internet & American Life Project** studies the social impact of the internet. The Project examines the way that people's internet use affects their families, communities, health care, education, civic and political life, and workplaces.

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4 Internet

The Mainstreaming of Online Life

On October 13, 1994, Netscape's Mosaic browser was made available for free on a company Web site. If there was a moment that could be considered the dawn of the popular internet, that was it. That day, thousands of people downloaded the browser and began to experience the World Wide Web, itself a little more than three years old, in a completely new way. Browsers were to the Web what paper was to ink. They used a simple format called hypertext markup language (HTML) to display the material stored on other computers in an easy-to-grasp graphical presentation that came to be known as a Web page. The revolution was underway.

A decade later, the internet has reached into — and, in some cases, reshaped — just about every important realm of modern life. It has changed the way we inform ourselves, amuse ourselves, care for ourselves, educate ourselves, work, shop, bank, pray and stay in touch.

A Snapshot of Today's Internet


The Pew Internet & American Life Project conducts surveys that examine the use and social impact of this transformative new technology. Our most recent snapshot of the online population in America finds that it stands at 63% of the adults in the country, or about 128 million people age 18 or older. We also find that 81% of the nation's teenagers (those 12 to 17) go online — and many of them can scarcely imagine what the world was like way back when people weren't always connected, "always on."

On a typical day at the end of 2004, some 70 million American adults logged onto the internet to use email, get news, access government information, check out health and medical information, participate in auctions, book travel reservations, research their genealogy, gamble, seek out romantic partners and engage in countless other activities. That represents a 37% increase from the 52 million adults who were online on an average day in 2000 when the Pew Internet & American Life Project began its study of online life.

For the most part, the online world mirrors the offline world. People bring to the internet the activities, interests and behaviors that preoccupied them before the Web existed. Still, the internet has also enabled new kinds of activities that no one ever dreamed of doing before — certainly not in the way people are doing them now. For example, on a typical day, 5 million people post or share some kind of material on the Web through their own Web logs (or "blogs") or other content-creating applications; at least 4 million share music files on peer-to-peer networks; and 3 million people use the internet to rate a person, product or service.

EVER UPWARD: HOW USE OF THE INTERNET HAS GROWN

Growth of Activities on the Internet in Recent Years



This is How Many Americans Have Ever Done These Activities

97 million	Internet users have used government Web sites
93 million	have used the internet for health or medical purposes
84 million	got political news and used the internet to participate in the 2004 campaign
83 million	have bought products online
82 million	have used the internet for religious and spiritual purposes
48 million	have used email for spiritual or religious discussion (many were making prayer requests or responding to prayer requests)
38 million	have sent email to government officials to try to influence policy decisions.
36 million	have become members of online support groups


Source: Pew Internet Project. Totals are for Americans age 18 or older.

Percent of Adult Americans Who Use the Internet



Source: Pew Internet Project (except for '95 data, from Pew Research Center for The People & The Press)

Number of Adult Americans Online on a Typical Day



Source: Pew Internet Project

The New Normal


The Web has become the “new normal” in the American way of life; those who don’t go online constitute an ever-shrinking minority. And as the online population has grown rapidly, its composition has changed rapidly. At the infant stage, the internet’s user population was dominated by young, white men who had high incomes and plenty of education. As it passed into its childhood years in 1999 and 2000, the population went mainstream; women reached parity with men online, lots more minority families joined the party, and more people with modest levels of income and education came online.

This transition altered the internet’s social environment. These early adopters loved the liberation they got from being online. They liked the fact that they could get news from nontraditional sources. Back in 1996, 56% of those who got political news online said they preferred the internet because they could get extra information that was not available from traditional news sources. At the same time, just 18% said they preferred the internet because it was convenient. These early adopters wanted to topple all manner of institutions and establish a new order in virtual space. They had a utopian sense of the transformative power of the new technology.


The later adopters are not looking to this technology to overturn the existing order. They like the internet because it can make them more productive and more connected. There is an unsentimental outlook. Like most later adopters of technology, they need to be shown that there is a real, immediate and practical value in embracing the new. They are very fond of email, and when they go to the internet to shop or get information they gravitate to the Web-based versions of traditional retail institutions and news organizations. By 2004, fully 89% of those who went online for political news were getting it from the Web sites of traditional news organizations. About half of those political news consumers (48%) cited convenience as a prime reason for using the internet, while just 33% said they used the internet because they didn't get all the information they needed from traditional sources.

Now we are in the midst of yet another important change in the internet – the rapid switchover from dial-up access to high-speed broadband connections. More than half of Americans who go online now have access to always-on connections at home or work, and they are different kinds of users than those with dial-up connections. They spend more time online. They do more online activities, especially those that exploit bigger information “pipelines,” such as accessing streaming video. They are much more likely to create content and share it with the rest of the online population. And they report greater levels of satisfaction with the role of the internet in their lives.


Growth of Internet Usage by Gender



Growth of Internet Usage by Age



Growth of Internet Usage by Race/Ethnicity



Source: Pew Internet Project (except for '95 data, from Pew Research Center for The People & The Press)

* The Pew Internet Project conducts phone interviews only in English, so these figures represent English-speaking Hispanics.

Different People Use the Internet in Different Ways

MEN ARE MORE LIKELY THAN WOMEN TO DO THESE ACTIVITIES ONLINE	ONLINE MEN	ONLINE WOMEN
Get news	77%	66%
Buy travel services or make reservation	60%	51%
Check sports scores and information	59%	27%
Get political news	57%	42%
Participate in online auction	28%	18%
Create content for the internet	25%	16%
Download music files	18%	11%
Buy/sell stocks, bonds, mutual funds	16%	9%
WOMEN ARE MORE LIKELY THAN MEN TO DO THESE ACTIVITIES ONLINE	ONLINE WOMEN	ONLINE MEN
Get health information	85%	75%
Get spiritual and religious information	73%	56%
Use support-group Web sites	63%	46%
ONLINE WHITES ARE MORE LIKELY THAN MINORITIES TO DO THESE ACTIVITIES	ONLINE WHITES	ONLINE MINORITIES
Buy a product	63%	53%
Participate in online auction	24%	16%
AFRICAN-AMERICANS ARE MORE LIKELY THAN WHITES TO DO THESE ACTIVITIES ONLINE	ONLINE BLACKS	ONLINE WHITES
Do research for school or job training	71%	58%
Look for information about a new job	61%	38%
Listen to music online	46%	30%
Download music files	25%	13%
HISPANICS ARE MORE LIKELY THAN NON-HISPANIC WHITES TO DO THESE ACTIVITIES ONLINE	ONLINE HISPANICS	ONLINE WHITES
Look for new job information	61%	38%
Listen to music online	46%	30%
YOUNG INTERNET USERS (AGES 18-29) ARE MORE LIKELY THAN OTHERS TO DO THESE ACTIVITIES ONLINE	YOUNG INTERNET USERS	THOSE 30+
Research for school or job training	76%	48%
Look for new job information	65%	31%
Use instant messaging	59%	33%
Listen to music online	53%	27%
Look up sports scores and information	51%	37%
Look for information about a place to live	43%	27%
Download music files	28%	11%
Share files from my computer	27%	17%
Log on using a wireless device	26%	13%
Using dating Web sites	16%	5%
ONLINE SENIORS (65+) ARE MORE LIKELY THAN YOUNG INTERNET USERS TO DO THIS ONLINE	ONLINE SENIORS	THOSE 18-29
Use email	96%	91%
ONLINE MIDDLE-AGED (30-64) ARE MORE LIKELY THAN THE YOUNG OR SENIORS TO DO THIS ONLINE	ONLINE MIDDLE-AGED	YOUNGER AND OLDER INTERNET USERS
Research a product or service	81%	71%
Look for health and medical information	70%	57%
Do work-related research	56%	38%


Source: Pew Internet Project surveys 2004

Who Goes Online — and Why

No matter how fast an online connection they have, different people still use the internet in different ways. For example, online men are more likely than online women to use the internet to get news, check out sports and execute financial transactions. In contrast, online women are more likely to get health information and religious news and to use email to maintain and deepen personal relationships. African-Americans are among the most likely to get religious and spiritual information, while Latinos are among the most likely to access cultural material, such as information about music.


The longer the internet is around, the more people expect of it. Increasingly, it is seen as a utility rather than a novelty. In a survey at the end of 2002, we found that large majorities of internet users and non-users said they expected to find news, medical information, government information and commercial products and services online — to say nothing of friends, family and colleagues. It's no wonder that people report to us that their use of the internet improves their lives in multiple ways. More than half of all internet users told us in earlier surveys that the internet has helped bring significant improvements in communicating with their friends and family; 41% say it has helped them shop, and nearly the same number say it has improved the way they do their jobs. Over a third say their internet use has improved the way they take care of their health and a like number say the internet has improved their dealings with government.

Broadband at Home, in Millions



Source: Pew Internet Project

Percentage of Users Who Say the Internet has Helped ...



Source: Pew Internet Project surveys 2000-2001

Demographics of Internet Users

Sixty-three percent of American adults now use the internet. Here is the percentage of each group that goes online.

Women	61%
Men	66%
AGE	
18-29	78%
30-49	74%
50-64	60%
65+	25%
RACE/ETHNICITY	
White, non-Hispanic	67%
Black, non-Hispanic	43%
Hispanic	59%
COMMUNITY TYPE	
Urban	62%
Suburban	68%
Rural	56%
HOUSEHOLD INCOME	
Less than \$30,000/yr.	44%
\$30,000-\$50,000	69%
\$50,000-\$75,000	81%
More than \$75,000	89%
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT	
Less than high school	32%
High school	52%
Some college	75%
College +	88%

Source: Pew Internet & American Life Project, May-June 2004 Tracking Survey. N=2,200 adults 18 and older. Margin of error is ±2% for results based on the full sample.

Despite the evolution in people's relationship with the internet, a few things haven't changed much as the Web marches into its second decade. First, email is still the killer app. It is the No. 1 activity and time consumer for the vast majority of internet users. Next comes information searching, then entertainment, then e-commerce. So even as internet use has grown exponentially, the hierarchy of metaphors that describe it has remained constant: The internet is most of all a mail pigeon, then a library, then an amusement park, then a shopping center.

In addition, gaps in internet usage still persist along multiple demographic lines. These include age (younger Americans are much more likely to be online than senior citizens), socio-economic status (richer and better educated Americans are more likely to use the internet than those with less income and education), disability status (only 38% of those with disabilities use the internet), community type (rural Americans are less likely to be online than suburban and urban Americans), and race and ethnicity (blacks are less likely to use the internet than whites).

“**E**ven as internet use has grown exponentially, the hierarchy of metaphors that describe it has remained constant: The internet is most of all a mail pigeon, then a library, then an amusement park, then a shopping center.”

Social Impact of the Internet

Over the years the Pew Internet & American Life Project has regularly asked people to describe what impact the internet has had on the way they lead their lives. Here is what they have told us:

- ***The internet enhances social interaction.*** People use email to deepen their connection to the people they like and love and increase the volume of communication they have with them. Email users, especially women, feel they are working on relationships and tending to their social networks as they exchange email.

The internet is more than a bonding agent; it is also a bridging agent for creating and sustaining community. Some 84% of internet users, or close to 100 million people, belong to groups that have an online presence. More than half have joined those groups since getting internet access; those who were group members before getting access say their use of the internet has bound them closer to the group. Members of online groups also say the internet increases the chances that they will interact with people outside their social class, racial group or generational cohort.

- ***People become more serious in their online endeavors as they use the internet.*** The variety of their online activities expands; their email content becomes more consequential. For instance, over time they are more likely to use email to express worries or seek advice on decisions or problems. They are also more likely to perform more financial transactions online. And in their work lives, 72% of those who use email

About 100 Million Internet Users Say They Belong to Online Communities

PERCENTAGE OF ONLINE COMMUNITY PARTICIPANTS WHO BELONG TO THIS TYPE OF GROUP




Source: Pew Internet Project January-February 2001

“Members of online groups say the internet increase the chances that they will interact with people outside their social class, racial group, or generational cohort.”

94 Million Americans Use the Internet for Health-Related Matters

% OF HEALTH SEEKERS WHO LOOK FOR INFORMATION ABOUT ...



Source: Pew Internet Project December 2002 survey

32 Million Americans Say They Read Blogs

BLOG READERS MAKE UP 27% OF ALL INTERNET USERS

- 9% of internet users said they read political blogs "frequently" or "sometimes" during the 2004 campaign
 - 7% of users say they have created a blog or web-based diary
 - 57% of bloggers are male
 - 48% are under age 30
 - Blog readership shot up 58% between February 2004 and November 2004 ...
- ... But 62% of online Americans are not even sure what a blog is

at work say it helps them communicate with more people; 71% say it helps them save time; and 59% say email improves workplace teamwork. At the same time, however, some reported that they felt that office use of email wasted time or made them too accessible to colleagues.

- *The internet changes the way people deal with health issues.* E-patients are creating a new health-care environment in which the traditional medical model – ruled by the all-wise doctor who tells patients what is best for them – is being challenged by a new model in which empowered patients can access large amounts of medical information, advice and support online, and act as partners with their doctors in making health-care decisions for themselves and their loved ones.


- *The internet creates new online town squares and civic storms.* The widely varying information sources that are available online, combined with the new opportunities that the internet creates for civic participation, have begun to reshape politics and community life. Nowhere was that more evident than in the rapid rise of blogs during the 2004 campaign. Political bloggers serve up a boiling caldron of facts, rumors, commentaries, conspiracy theories, ideological screeds and media criticisms. They had at least one significant impact on the campaign season last fall. It was a blogger who first marshaled evidence to question a story by CBS's *60 Minutes* about President Bush's service in the National Guard. The ensuing civic storm played out in both the blogosphere and the mainstream media simultaneously, and eventually forced anchorman Dan Rather to retract the story and CBS to fire four senior journalists.

The newfound importance of blogs was also illustrated early in 2005 by their use in linking communities in Southeast Asia with the rest of the world after the devastation caused by the year-end tsunami. Yet blogs are not the only online destination for e-citizens. On Web sites, in discussion groups and on listservs — automatic mailing lists for distributing email to groups of internet users — citizen activists are using the tools of online technology to organize, to mobilize and to raise record-setting sums of money.

- ***The internet enhances the relationship of citizens to their government.*** E-government applications are growing in popularity with online Americans. For instance, 38 million have sent email to government officials to try to influence policy decisions and another 29 million have researched or applied for government benefits on government Web sites. Many report that the convenience and usefulness of these sites have improved their perceptions of how government functions.

97 Million Americans Have Used Government Web Sites

HERE ARE SOME OF THE THINGS THEY HAVE DONE, IN MILLIONS




Source: Pew Internet Project surveys 2002-2003

Still, one constant about the internet is that for all its virtues, the online world can also be an unpleasant and even dangerous place. Spam clogs email inboxes to the point where a quarter of internet users said in early 2004 that they were using email less and 70% reported that it made their experiences online annoying. Our early reading is that the federal law passed in 2003 to address the flood of spam has not yet mitigated the problem, though some high-profile lawsuits against allegedly egregious spammers might have some impact if spammers begin to feel vulnerable. In addition, more aggressive filtering services seem to have helped cut off some spam.

By early 2005 there were even more malignant online plagues that were ruining the internet experiences of millions of users. These were caused by malicious software with a variety of names — worms, Trojan horses, spyware and malware — that commandeered computers and turned them into ad-generating machines or spam-generating hosts.

Then there were the problems caused by terrorists, child pornographers, the mob and drug dealers. The internet is a wonderful tool for communicating, gathering information and making transactions. However, it gives no privilege to good guys. The same technology that can help people find and resume relationships with long-lost friends can also bring predators into their lives. And the same tools that help those with rare forms of cancer build communities with fellow sufferers are also being used to support communities of pedophiles and to encourage teenage girls to become anorexic.

Percentage of Americans by Household Income with Broadband at Home



Source: Pew Internet Project

And Now, Broadband

The rapid growth of broadband use at home has been perhaps the most striking development in the internet population in the past four years. In 2000, about 5 million Americans — just a small fraction of internet users — said they had high-speed connections at home. By the end of 2004, nearly 60 million Americans with access to the internet at home logged on with a fast connection. When broadband at work is added, 72 million Americans have access to high-speed networks either at home or in the workplace. Those high-speed, always-on connections influence people's behavior online. Those with broadband log on more often and spend more time online. They do more internet activities. They more actively participate in the online commons by creating and sharing content. They change the way they allocate their time and they feel better about the internet's role in their lives.

Broadband Users are More Aggressive Users of the Internet than Dial-Up Users

ON ANY GIVEN DAY, THE PERCENTAGE OF INTERNET USERS WITH EACH CONNECTION WHO ARE DOING THIS ACTIVITY ONLINE

	BROADBAND-AT-HOME USERS	DIAL-UP-AT-HOME USERS	ALL INTERNET USERS	SURVEY DATE
Sending/receiving email	59%	41%	45%	May-June-04
Getting news	41	22	27	May-June-04
Checking weather	29	20	20	Jun-03
Doing job-related research	27	15	19	Feb-04
Looking for political information	21	8	13	May-June-04
Watching video clips or listening to audio clips	21	9	11	Mar-May-03
Banking online	19	6	9	Jun-03
Instant messaging	17	9	12	May-June-04
Playing games	14	8	9	Mar-May-03
Looking up phone numbers or addresses	12	5	7	Feb-04
Getting maps or driving directions	12	5	7	Feb-04
Creating content and sharing it online	11	3	4	Oct-02
Looking for new job information	6	4	4	May-June-04
Looking for a place to live	5	2	3	May-June-04
Participating in auctions	5	2	3	Feb-04
Reading blogs	4	2	3	Feb-04
Buying products	4	3	3	Feb-04
Buying or selling stocks/bonds	2	*	1	Feb-04

* Denotes a value less than 1%

Source: Pew Internet Project surveys 2002-2004

When asked how much time they spend online daily, relatively novice dial-up users (those who have been online for three years or less) say they spend about 83 minutes online per day. Dial-up users who have been online longer (for more than six years) say they spend roughly 94 minutes online per day. Daily time online jumps significantly for those with high-speed connections at home; these users say they spend approximately 107 minutes online on the average day. Broadband users are also much more likely than dial-up users to be online on the average day; 69% of high-speed users log onto the internet on the typical day versus 51% of dial-up users.

The broadband effect is equally vivid when comparing frequency of online activities. For instance, 26% of broadband users do work-related research online on the average day, compared with 14% of dial-up internet users. Similarly, 24% of high-speed users do research on a product on the average day, compared with 11% of dial-up users. Fully 46% of high-speed users turn to a search engine on the average day, compared with 25% of dial-up users.

Even the emerging blogosphere is dominated by broadband users. Among internet users who create or publish blogs, 70% have a high-speed connection at home. Of the readers, 56% have broadband at home.

Campaign News Sources: The Internet Difference in 2004

HOW HAVE YOU BEEN GETTING MOST OF YOUR NEWS ABOUT THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION?

	ALL AMERICANS	NON-INTERNET USERS	ALL INTERNET USERS	THOSE WITH BROADBAND AT HOME
Television	78%	84%	74%	70%
Newspapers	39%	40%	38%	36%
Internet	18%	n/a	28%	38%
Radio	17%	15%	18%	17%
Magazines	3%	3%	3%	3%

Source: Pew Internet Project 2004

Broadband and the 2004 Campaign

A look at how internet users gathered information about the 2004 presidential campaign illustrates the emerging impact of broadband. For the typical American, the internet is still a second-tier source for news about politics; television and the daily newspaper continue to lead the way. But for young Americans with high speed at home, the internet has taken on a distinctive role in how they get news about politics. Among this group, television is still the most widely used source, but the internet is now a strong second, while radio, newspapers and magazines lag well behind.

Here's how the numbers look from the survey we did right after the 2004 election: 18% of all Americans cited the internet as a leading source of political news, as did 28% of all internet users. Among those with high-speed connections at home, 38% cited the internet, surpassing the share who said daily newspapers (36%), and more than twice the percentage (16%) of dial-up users who said the internet is a main source for campaign news.

Among people under the age of 35 with high-speed connections at home, 40% said that the internet was their main source of campaign news, twice the number (21%) who cited the newspaper. By contrast, of those over age 35 with broadband at home, 26% said the internet was their main source of campaign news, compared with 45% in this group who said the newspaper is mainly where they turned for news about the campaign.

To be sure, some of this shift to the internet among young people represents a substitution effect; they are reading the daily newspaper online rather than picking up the hard copy. But this cohort of young high-speed users is also the most likely to seek out alternative news sources online, whether that means international news sources, "pure play" internet news sites, magazines or blogs. Young people with fast home connections use the internet to get more detail about what the mainstream media cover, to explore different perspectives on the news, and to fact-check politicians, policy wonks and the mainstream media. How this broadband effect shapes the collective civic intelligence, activism and voting behavior of young people bears close watching in the future.

A final point about broadband users also warrants notice: High-speed users are increasingly taking the internet wherever they go. When asked whether they have ever logged onto the internet with a wireless device, 28% of home broadband users said they had done so, compared with just 9% of dial-up users. Nearly one third of Americans now own devices (e.g. laptop or cell phone) that can access the internet wirelessly, and with wireless networks becoming faster, the internet's status as an all purpose information tool will continue to grow.

Looking Ahead

Despite the rapid growth of home broadband penetration, Americans are laggards in comparison with people in some other parts of the developed world. The most recent data cited by the Federal Communications Commission show that in 2002, South Korea ranked first in the world; 21.3% of its citizens had a broadband connection at home. Hong Kong was second with 14.9%; Canada was third with 11.2%, and the United States was eleventh with 6.9%. Some of this gap has to do with geography. America's large rural expanses make it difficult to provide high-speed connections in many areas of the country. Just 12% of Americans living in rural areas have high-speed at home, compared with 29% of people who live in cities and suburbs.

Addressing the question of how to facilitate faster broadband uptake in the United States is likely to occupy the attention of policymakers in 2005, especially since the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case that will determine whether cable television companies and phone companies are required to open their lines into American homes to their competitors.

Our data show that people don't switch to broadband for one thing, but for many things. They aren't looking for a new killer app. Rather, their increasing reliance on the internet for a whole range of activities — accessing everything from medical information to political news to driving directions, or just staying in touch with family and friends — makes dial-up more cumbersome over time. It is the internet's abundance and diversity of information, easily found and conveniently shared, that make it such an integral part of modern life.

This relationship will only deepen over time as information and communication technologies evolve and improve. In the future, wireless connectivity will increase through laptops, cell phones and personal digital devices such as Palm Pilots and Blackberries. Phones themselves will increasingly become powerful computing and gaming devices. More things will become connected to the internet, from cars to home appliances to jewelry. And more meaning will be extracted from the information online as search engines get better and as connections between related bits of data grow.

The internet is constantly reshaping people's informational and social universes, but people are constantly reshaping the internet as well. One day someone gets the bright idea to start posting family pictures online, and, *voilà*, a whole new application takes off. With much of the remaining third of unconnected Americans likely to get internet access in the coming years, and with high-speed and mobile access increasingly the norm, how these trends accelerate and recombine should make internet watching a fascinating and important undertaking for years to come.

The **Pew Hispanic Center** is dedicated to improving understanding of the diverse Hispanic population in the United States and to chronicling Latinos' growing impact on the nation. The Center conducts nonpartisan research on Latino trends in demographics, economics, education, immigration and identity, and its polls and nationwide surveys explore Latino attitudes on public policy issues as well as their beliefs, values and experiences.

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5 Hispanics

A People in Motion

The Hispanic* population of the United States is growing fast and changing fast. The places Latinos live, the jobs they hold, the schooling they complete, the languages they speak, even their attitudes on key political and social issues, are all in flux. They now constitute this country's largest minority, but they are not an easily identified racial or ethnic group. Rather, they are defined by shared elements of Latin American ancestry and culture. In this chapter, we examine Hispanic demographic trends and labor market and educational outcomes; we also analyze the diverse attitudes, values, beliefs and language patterns of the Latino population.

* This chapter uses the words Latino and Hispanic interchangeably. The terms white and black refer to non-Hispanics.

INTRODUCTION

Population and Demography

The 2000 census marked the Hispanic population at 35.3 million people, an increase of 58% over 1990. Since then, growth has continued at a brisk pace. The total Hispanic population in 2004 was 40.4 million. That is a jump of more than 14% in just four years; meanwhile, the non-Hispanic population was up by barely 2%. The impact of Latino population growth is magnified by the fact that the white and African-American populations are not only stable in size but also aging. As the huge baby boom generation moves toward retirement, young Latinos are filling in behind them.

Large-scale immigration from Latin America, especially Mexico, developed in the 1970s, gathered momentum in the 1980s and surged after the mid-1990s. As a result, immigration drove most of the Latino population growth over this period. A substantial share of the growth, particularly in the past decade, has come through illegal immigration. Although there are no exact numbers, demographers who specialize in immigration estimate that the total undocumented population in this country is currently 10 million. Roughly 60% are believed to come from Mexico and another 20% from the rest of Latin America, bringing the Hispanic share of that total to 80%, or 8 million.

Latino immigrants, most of them young adults in their prime child-bearing years, have proved highly fertile, with birth rates twice as high as those of non-Hispanics. Consequently, Latino population growth in the next few decades will be driven primarily by increases in the second generation. These native-born, English-

A U.S. Snapshot: Population by Race and Ethnicity, 2004

	POPULATION	PERCENT DISTRIBUTION
Hispanic	40,424,528	14%
Native born	22,381,207	7.7%
Foreign born	18,043,321	6.2%
Non-Hispanic white	194,876,871	68%
Non-Hispanic black	34,919,473	12%
Non-Hispanic Asian	12,342,486	4%
Non-Hispanic other	5,717,108	2%
Total population	288,280,465	100%

Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Current Population Survey, March 2004

speaking, U.S.-educated Hispanics will have a very different impact on the country than their immigrant parents had. That impact is still to be fully felt, as half of the offspring of Latino immigrants are 11 or younger. Their youth, coupled with the expected increase in their numbers, signals a growing presence of Latinos in the school-age population and in the pool of new entrants to the labor force.

As the Hispanic population grows and shows signs of becoming less immigrant-based, it is also starting to spread out. Although Hispanics are still concentrated geographically in California, Texas and other states that have had large Latino communities for decades, this population has begun to disperse across the country, with very fast growth in states as scattered as Georgia, Nebraska and Washington.


The Hispanic Labor Force

The rapid increase in the Hispanic population has made it the second-largest ethnic or racial group in the labor force behind whites. Latinos now make up 13% of the U.S. labor force, but they are expected to account for about one half of the growth in the labor force between now and 2020. Not surprisingly, Hispanics also account for a disproportionate share of new jobs. Despite their success in finding employment, Latino workers, especially recent immigrants, are less educated and less experienced than other workers. As a result, they are concentrated in relatively low-skill occupations, have a higher unemployment rate and earn less than the average for all workers. Poverty is also high among Latino households and wealth accumulation is low; Hispanic households own less than 10 cents for every dollar in wealth owned by white households. Meanwhile, Latino immigrants retain strong economic ties to their countries of origin and many of them regularly send money home. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, more than \$30 billion was remitted to Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2003.

Schooling

Fast growth in the number of Hispanic children has also led to increases in U.S. school enrollments since 1980. This trend will continue at least through the next two decades. As their numbers have increased, Hispanic youths have been doing better in school: A rising proportion of U.S.-educated Hispanic children finish high school and more are going on to college. Yet even though Latino youths have narrowed some important educational gaps, Latinos continue to lag behind white students at all key milestones of their educational journey. In high school, Hispanic youths complete a less rigorous curriculum and, on average, score lower on national assessments and college entrance examinations. Although college entry has significantly expanded among Hispanic youths, they remain much less likely to finish college than their white peers.

Latino Population of the United States by Place of Origin



Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from the 2000 Census

Hispanic Identity

The Hispanic population is not a racial group, nor does it share a common language or culture. The single overarching trait that all Hispanics share in common is a connection by ancestry to Latin America. This population, in fact, traces its origins to many countries with varied cultures, and while some Latinos have family histories in the United States that date back centuries, others are recent arrivals. Some speak only English, others only Spanish, and many are bilingual. Given this diversity, it is not easy to define an identity, belief system and set of values that all Hispanics share. Moreover, this is a population that is changing the way it thinks. Immigrants are a people in motion who are learning about a new land – even as their children are drawing from both their parents' culture and powerful American influences to shape their attitudes. Research shows that the process of change is widespread and powerful, and that language plays a central role. Latinos who speak only Spanish, almost all of them immigrants, share a set of views on a variety of issues that distinguish them from native-born Americans. Meanwhile, those who speak English express attitudes more similar to those of the U.S. population in general. The evidence shows that English, and the views that come with it, gains ground in the first generation – among the foreign-born – and becomes dominant among their children in the second generation.


DEMOGRAPHICS

The Hispanic population of the United States more than doubled between 1980 and 2000, increasing from 14.6 million to 35.3 million. The Pew Hispanic Center projects that the Hispanic population will reach 47.7 million by the end of this decade, and 60.4 million by 2020.

As the Latino population grows, its composition is undergoing a fundamental change. Births to Hispanic immigrants, rather than immigration itself, will be the key source of population growth in the near future. By 2020, second-generation Hispanics are projected to reach 21.7 million in number, representing 36% of the overall Hispanic population, up from 9.9 million in 2000, when they represented 28%. Latino immigrants will increase in number to 20.6 million from 14.2 million by 2020 but their share will diminish to 34%, from 40%. The remaining 18.2 million Hispanics are expected to be third- or higher-generation Hispanics — those who were born in this country and whose parents were born here as well.


Growth of the Hispanic population accounts for a disproportionate share of total population growth in the United States. Between 1980 and 2000, the increase of 20.7 million in the Hispanic population accounted for 38% of the nation's total population growth. The white population increased by 14.3 million and accounted for 26% of the growth. Between 2000 and 2020 the Hispanic population is projected to grow by 25.1 million and the white population by 13.3 million. In other words, Hispanics should account for 46% and whites 24% of total population growth in the next two decades.

Hispanic Population, Actual and Projected, 1980-2020, in millions




Source: U.S. Census Bureau for 1980 to 2000; Pew Hispanic Center and Urban Institute for projections for 2010 and 2020

Change in U.S. Population by Race and Ethnicity, Actual and Projected, 1980-2020, in millions



Source: U.S. Census Bureau for 1980 to 2000; Pew Hispanic Center and Urban Institute for projections for 2000 and 2020


Age and Gender Distribution of Hispanics and Non-Hispanic Whites



Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Current Population Survey, March 2004

The rapid growth of the Hispanic population is partly a function of its youth. Compared with whites, a greater share of the Hispanic population is concentrated in childbearing years. Their relative youth is evident in age and gender distributions. The white age structure is relatively top heavy, with many older members at the top and fewer younger members at the base. In contrast, the Hispanic population has a broader base and narrows toward the top. This shape is characteristic of younger populations with high fertility levels.

Age and Gender Distribution of First-, Second-, Third- and Higher-Generation Hispanics



Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Current Population Survey, March 2004


Within the Hispanic population, the age and gender structures of first, second, and third and higher generations differ markedly. The Latino immigrant population is dominated by working-age adults and men: There are 116 male immigrants for every 100 female immigrants. In contrast, second-generation Hispanics are nearly equally divided between males

and females, and the bulk of this generation is of school age. Half of second-generation Hispanics are currently 11 years old or younger. Half of third- and higher-generation Hispanics are 24 or younger, which gives this group an age structure similar to that of the overall Latino population.

Hispanics are relatively concentrated geographically. Nearly 80% live in California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico or Colorado. But as the Hispanic population grew between 1980 and 2000, it also dispersed somewhat. Tracking that movement requires examining both the speed and the size of growth in new areas. In addition to Florida, seven states — Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia and Massachusetts — saw growth that was both fast (increases of more than 200%) and sizable (more than 200,000 additional Hispanics per state). States with established Hispanic populations, such as California, also saw their numbers grow substantially, but because they started with a large base, the rate of growth was slower. States with an emerging Hispanic population, such as Nebraska and Kansas, produced smaller absolute numbers (increases of fewer than 200,000 Hispanics between 1980 and 2000) but very high rates of growth (more than 200%).


Despite their geographic concentration, most Latinos live scattered through neighborhoods where they are a small share of the population. Some 20 million Hispanics — 57% of the total — lived in neighborhoods in which they made up less than half the population at the time of the 2000 census. These Latinos lived in census tracts where, on average, only 7% of residents were Hispanics. This pattern of dispersal even holds for Latino immigrants and for low-income Hispanics, although to a lesser degree.

Number of Hispanics by County, 2000



Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from the 2000 Census

Hispanic Population Growth by State, 1980–2000



Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from the 1980 and 2000 Censuses

Distribution of Hispanics by Neighborhood Ethnicity, 1990 and 2000

	HISPANIC POPULATION (MILLIONS)		DISTRIBUTION	
	1990	2000	1990	2000
Hispanic-minority neighborhoods	13.4	20.2	61%	57%
Hispanic-majority neighborhoods	8.5	15.0	39%	43%
All neighborhoods	21.9	35.2	100%	100%

Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from 2000 Census Summary File 3 and Geolytics for 1990 data converted to 2000 census tract boundaries

Note: A Hispanic-majority neighborhood is a census tract in which 50% or more of the population is Latino.

“As of 2000, 57% of all Hispanics were dispersed, while 43% were living in Latino-majority neighborhoods. By this measure, the Hispanic population is somewhat less concentrated than the African-American population.”

The remainder of the Hispanic population in 2000 — 15 million — lived in neighborhoods where Latinos are a majority. These communities are large, and the Hispanic population that lives in such neighborhoods has been growing faster than the Hispanic population that lives dispersed among non-Hispanics. A comparison of data from the 1990 and 2000 census counts shows that as the size of the Hispanic population increased in big cities with already large Hispanic populations, such as New York and Los Angeles, these majority-Latino neighborhoods spread across the urban landscape. Although such neighborhoods where Latinos dominate can be highly visible and sometimes controversial, they are not the norm for the Latino population.

Thus, the recent growth of the Hispanic population has produced two countervailing trends in residential settlement: dispersal and concentration. The increase of the Hispanic population between 1990 and 2000 was almost equally shared between neighborhoods where Latinos are a majority of residents (6.5 million) and neighborhoods where they are a minority (6.9 million). As of 2000, 57% of all Hispanics were dispersed, while 43% were living in Latino-majority neighborhoods. By this measure, the Hispanic population is somewhat less concentrated than the African-American population. In 2000, some 48% of the black population lived in census tracts with a majority-black population. Predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods are also diverse in their own way, as they are home to a variety of Latinos — immigrant and native born, Spanish speakers and English speakers, the poor and the middle class.

The U.S. Labor Force: A Racial and Ethnic Breakdown

	ALL WORKERS	HISPANICS	WHITE	NON-HISPANICS BLACK	OTHER
Population (age 16+)	223,653,344	28,240,747	156,614,899	25,254,576	13,543,122
Labor force	148,612,727	19,501,923	103,790,890	16,382,681	8,937,233
Employment	140,554,632	18,169,653	99,324,876	14,598,564	8,461,539
Unemployment	8,058,095	1,332,270	4,466,014	1,784,117	475,694
Labor force participation rate (%)	66.4	69.1	66.3	64.9	66.0
Employment-to-population ratio (%)	62.8	64.3	63.4	57.8	62.5
Unemployment rate (%)	5.4	6.8	4.3	10.9	5.3

Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of Current Population Survey data, third quarter 2004


Note: Data are non-seasonally adjusted.

HISPANICS IN THE LABOR FORCE

Hispanics are the second-largest group of workers in the labor force behind whites. In the third quarter of 2004, there were 28 million Latinos of working age (16 or older). The number of working-age Latinos is nearly 3 million greater than the number of blacks and more than double the number of other minority groups.

Latinos are the most likely of all racial or ethnic groups to seek work. In the third quarter of 2004, 69.1% of Hispanics were either at work or actively seeking work. That is about 3 percentage points higher than the rate for whites and blacks. Of the Latinos in the labor market, 18.2 million are employed and the remaining 1.3 million are unemployed. That translates into an unemployment rate of 6.8% in the third quarter of 2004, which is higher than the unemployment rate of 4.3% among whites but lower than the 10.9% rate among blacks. Despite a relatively high unemployment rate, the employment-to-population ratio shows that 64.3% of the Latino working-age population is gainfully employed. That is higher than the proportion for any other racial or ethnic group.

Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Labor Forces, Actual and Projected



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics for data through 2000. Estimate for 2020 is the mid-range of projections by Pew Hispanic Center and Urban Institute

Nativity of the Hispanic Labor Force, Current and Projected (in thousands)

	2004	2020	CHANGE
First generation	10,648	13,397	2,749
Second generation	2,856	8,044	5,188
Third and higher generations	5,762	7,462	1,700
All Hispanics	19,266	28,903	9,637


Sources: For 2004 estimates: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of Current Population Survey data. Estimates for 2020 are the mid-range of projections by Pew Hispanic Center and Urban Institute
Note: Data for 2004 represent the average of the first three quarters.

Distribution of the Labor Force by Age and Education

	HISPANIC	NON-HISPANIC
AGE		
16-24	19.9%	15.1%
25-34	30.6%	20.3%
35-44	25.3%	24.1%
45 and older	24.2%	40.5%
EDUCATION		
Less than high school	36.1%	8.7%
High school	30.5%	30.6%
Some college	20.8%	29.8%
College degree	12.5%	30.9%

Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of Current Population Survey data
Note: Data are for third quarter 2004 and are non-seasonally adjusted.

Hispanic Share of Employment in Selected Industries: 5 Highest and 5 Lowest



Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of Current Population Survey data
Note: Data are for third quarter 2004 and are non-seasonally adjusted.

The prominence of Latinos in the labor market is relatively new. As recently as 1980, there were only 6.1 million Hispanics in the labor force. Their rapid growth saw them overtake the black labor force in the late 1990s. This growth was driven by immigration, as more than one half of the Latino labor force is foreign born. The Hispanic labor force is expected to continue growing at a fast pace and to expand by nearly 10 million workers between now and 2020.

Assuming that current trends persist, future growth of the Hispanic labor force will be driven less by immigration and more by the children of immigrants. Between 2004 and 2020, immigration is expected to add 2.7 million Hispanic workers, but the second generation of Latinos is projected to contribute almost double that number. The overall increase in the Latino work force will constitute about one half of the total increase in the U.S. labor force.


These trends have kept the Hispanic labor force relatively young. One half of the Hispanic labor force is under 35 years old, compared with just over one third of the non-Hispanic labor force. Latino workers also lag in education. Thirty six percent of Hispanic workers lack a high school degree compared with fewer than 9% of non-Hispanic workers. At the other end of the educational spectrum, non-Hispanic workers are nearly three times as likely to have a college degree.

The youth and education level of Hispanic workers translates into a concentration in relatively low-skill jobs. Latinos account for more than 30% of workers in private household services and about 20% of workers in construction, agriculture, forestry and fishing, nondurable manufacturing, and eating, drinking and lodging services.

Looking at occupations, Latinos have very low representation in high-skill occupations such as architecture and engineering, legal, computer and mathematical science, health care, and life, physical and social sciences. Hispanic representation in these occupations hovers in the range of 5%. On the other hand, Latinos make up 40% of employment in farming, fishing and forestry.


The unemployment rate — a key indicator of labor market outcomes — reveals that Latinos have fared better than blacks but not as well as whites. The record economic expansion of the 1990s was especially beneficial to foreign-born Hispanics, whose unemployment rate fell to 5.1% in 2000 from 9.3% in 1995. Other groups also benefited during this time but not by as much. The 2001 recession rolled back the gains for all workers, and more than 2 million workers in all, including 300,000 Hispanic workers, joined the ranks of the unemployed that year. Signs of a recovery in the job market first appeared in mid-2003. Among Latinos, immigrants again led the way, gaining more than 630,000 jobs in 2003, compared with a gain of less than 75,000 by the native-born. The unemployment rate for foreign-born Hispanics is now at 6.4%, while for native-born Hispanics it remains above 8%.

Hispanic Share of Employment in Selected Occupations: 5 Highest and 5 Lowest




Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of Current Population Survey data
Note: Data are for third quarter 2004 and are non-seasonally adjusted.

Unemployment Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 1995 to 2004



Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of Current Population Survey data
Note: Revisions in the Current Population Survey slightly affect the comparability of the unemployment rate over time. Data for 2004 represent the average of the first three quarters.

Median Weekly Earnings by Race and Ethnicity (Full-Time and Part-Time Workers Combined)




Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of Current Population Survey data

Note: The data represent annual averages in 2003 dollars, except for 2004 data, which represent the average of the first three quarters.

Another important indicator — the median weekly wage — shows that foreign-born Latinos earn the least of all workers in the labor force. Reflecting, among other things, their lower level of education, lack of labor-market experience and immigration status, foreign-born Latinos earn about \$200 per week less than whites. The median earnings of native-born Hispanics and blacks are virtually identical and fall in the middle of the wage spectrum, roughly \$125 per week less than the earnings of whites. Earning growth has been slow for all groups, especially since the recession, and the earning gaps have not narrowed since 1995.

The poverty rate fell steadily between 1995 and 2001, but it increased for all groups following the 2001 recession. Currently, 22.5% of Latinos are living below the poverty line, compared with 24.4% of blacks and only 8.2% of whites.

Poverty Rates by Race and Ethnicity



Source: U.S. Census Bureau


Note: Blacks include some Hispanics, and changes in the race question affect data from 2002 on.

Low wealth is characteristic of minority communities. In 2002, Hispanic households had a slightly higher median level of wealth than black households, but less than 10 cents for every dollar in wealth owned by white households.

Notwithstanding their low earnings and wealth, foreign-born Latinos remit income to their countries of origin with great frequency. A Pew Hispanic Center and Inter-American Development Bank study shows that over 40% of adult, foreign-born Hispanics — about 6 million people — sent remittances on a regular basis in 2003. Two thirds of those remitted money at least one a month.


The remittances benefit significant shares of the adult populations in the receiving countries. In the five countries studied, anywhere from 14% of the adult population (in Ecuador) to 28% of the adult population (in El Salvador) received remittances in 2003.

Median Net Worth of Households by Race and Ethnicity in 1996 and 2002




Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of Survey of Income and Program Participation data
Note: Data are in 2003 dollars.

Frequency of Remittances to Countries of Origin by Hispanic Immigrants



Source: Pew Hispanic Center and Multilateral Investment Fund, Inter-American Development Bank (2003 data)
Note: 42% of adult, foreign-born Latinos in the U.S. regularly send remittances to their country of origin.

Percentage of Adults Receiving Remittances by Country




Source: Pew Hispanic Center and Multilateral Investment Fund, Inter-American Development Bank (2003 data)

Who's at School: Enrollment in Grades K-12 (in thousands)

GRADE LEVEL	HISPANIC				NON-HISPANIC			TOTAL
	1ST GENERATION	2ND GENERATION	3RD+ GENERATION	ALL HISPANICS	WHITE	BLACK	OTHER	
Kindergarten	44	431	244	718	2,280	582	208	3,788
Grades 1-4	312	1,588	858	2,758	10,140	2,566	874	16,338
Grades 5-8	484	1,420	808	2,712	10,470	2,649	901	16,732
High school	551	1,048	628	2,227	10,390	2,541	889	16,047
Total	1,391	4,487	2,538	8,416	33,280	8,338	2,873	52,906

Source: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from the Current Population Survey, October 2001

Projected Size of the 5-to-19-year-old Population



Source: Pew Hispanic Center and Urban Institute

HISPANICS IN SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES

Because Hispanics are a relatively young population, they have had a major impact on U.S. school systems. Since 1980 the number of Hispanic children has nearly doubled, and the additional 4.5 million Latino children account for the bulk of the growth in the total number of children in the United States. There were 8.4 million Hispanic children enrolled in grades K-12 in 2001, accounting for 16% of all students. Their share is higher in the lower grades: 19% of students in kindergarten in 2001 were Latinos.

U.S. schools will continue to experience growing Hispanic enrollments for years to come. The Hispanic 5-to-19-year-old population is projected to grow from 11 million in 2005 to 16 million in 2020. By then Hispanics are projected to be 24% of the 5-to-19-year-old population. The second-largest minority group of youth — blacks — are not projected to grow, remaining at 10 million in number. Their share of the 5-to-19-year-old population is projected to fall to 14%.

It is important to distinguish between native-born Hispanics and foreign-born Hispanics when analyzing educational achievement. More than 60% of Hispanic adults immigrated to the United States, and most of them did not attend U.S. schools because they arrived after age 18. But fewer than 20% of Hispanic students in grades K-12 immigrated to the United States, so the educational status of Latino youth is largely determined in U.S. schools. Looking at the whole Latino population, it is the least educated racial or ethnic group, with only American Indians and Alaskan Natives faring as poorly. For example, almost 90% of all young adults in the United States have finished high school, compared with only 62% of Latinos. While this is an important measure of the diminished social and economic prospects facing the Latino population, it is a poor indicator of what is happening in U.S. schools. Instead, that dramatic shortfall reflects the presence of many poorly educated adult immigrants. In contrast, 84% of native-born Hispanic young adults have finished high school, which is a better gauge of how Hispanic children are faring in U.S. schools.


Finishing high school is a basic educational milestone, and here Latino children have made steady progress. In 1970, 40% of native-born Hispanic teens had finished high school. By 2000, the rate had improved significantly to 60% and the gap with white youth had narrowed. Similarly, Hispanic high school graduates go on to college at much higher rates than they did 30 years ago. Seventy percent of Latinos in the high school class of 1992 moved on to college, significantly higher than the 50% in the class of 1972.

Educational Indicators for Native-Born Young Adults

	HISPANIC	NON-HISPANIC	
		WHITE	BLACK
Native-born 25-to-29 year olds completing high school ^a	83.6%	93.6%	88.1%
Native-born 18- to-24-year-old high-school graduates enrolled in college ^b	37.6%	45.0%	39.6%
Native-born 25-to-29 year olds completing a bachelor's degree ^a	15.6%	34.1%	17.5%


Sources: Pew Hispanic Center tabulations from a) Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, March 2004, and b) Current Population Survey, October 2001

High School Completion Rates of U.S.-Born 18-to-19-year-olds



Source: Georges Vemez and Lee Mizell, *Monitoring the Education Progress of Hispanics*, RAND, August 2002


Enrollment of 3-to-5-year-olds in Early Education Programs



Source: National Center for Education Statistics, *The Condition of Education, 2002*. Data are for 2001.

Nonetheless, there are large disparities between Hispanic and white students across the educational spectrum. Differences in early learning set the stage for later problems. Before the onset of formal schooling, Hispanic children are significantly less likely than other children to attend preschool programs. In 2001, 40% of Hispanic children 3 to 5 years old enrolled in early childhood education programs, compared with about 60% of other children.

High School Graduates Completing Advanced Math and Science Courses




Source: National Center for Education Statistics, *The Condition of Education, 2004*. Data are for 2000.

At the high school level, while many Latino youths graduate, their course work in mathematics, science and English is less advanced than that of their white classmates. For example, 31% of Hispanic high school graduates and 47% of white students complete at least one math course more challenging than Algebra II and Geometry I. This difference in high school learning contributes to the differences in what white and Hispanic youths accomplish when they go on to college.

Latino college students do not attend the same kinds of institutions as do white undergraduates. Latinos are more likely to attend community colleges and the four-year colleges they attend are more likely to be less-selective institutions. This disparity in college outcomes partly reflects differences in high school preparation, but other factors are also involved. Even comparing Hispanic college freshmen with white freshmen who have an average or near-average level of high school preparation in terms of coursework, the Hispanic freshmen tend to attend less selective colleges or universities. One plausible explanation is economic. Tuition is less expensive at community colleges and many less selective public four-year colleges; students can study while living at home; and course schedules accommodate students who must work full time as they go to college.


Hispanic undergraduates are much less likely to finish college than white undergraduates. Almost half of all young white postsecondary entrants finish a bachelor's degree, in comparison with fewer than a quarter of all young Hispanic postsecondary entrants. This critical difference can partly be accounted for by high school preparation and college-entry differences. But even similarly prepared Hispanic and white students have very different graduation rates. Looking only at students who left high school with an average level of preparation, whites were twice as likely as Latinos to graduate from college — 37% versus 19%. And these differences persist for similarly prepared entrants within similar colleges. For example, among Hispanic four-year college entrants with an average or near-average level of high school preparation attending nonselective colleges, 43% completed a bachelor's degree. Similarly prepared white entrants at nonselective institutions graduated at a 62% rate.

Where Hispanics and Whites Go to College, by Type of Institution




Source: Rick Fry, *Latino Youth Finishing College: The Role of Selective Pathways*, Pew Hispanic Center, 2004
 Note: Data are for Hispanic and white students with average levels of high school preparation.

College Graduation Rates for Hispanics and Whites



Source: Rick Fry, *Latino Youth Finishing College: The Role of Selective Pathways*, Pew Hispanic Center, 2004
 Note: Graduation rates reflect the achievement of eighth-grade students in 1988 who were followed until 2000.

College Graduation Rates for Hispanics and Whites by Type of College




Source: Rick Fry, *Latino Youth Finishing College: The Role of Selective Pathways*, Pew Hispanic Center, 2004
 Note: Data are for Hispanic and white students with average levels of high school preparation. Graduation rates reflect the achievement of eighth-grade students in 1988 who were followed until 2000.

Language Use Among Latino Adults

	SPANISH DOMINANT	BILINGUAL	ENGLISH DOMINANT
First generation	72%	24%	4%
Second generation	7%	47%	46%
Third and higher generations	0%	22%	78%
All Latinos	47%	28%	25%

Source: Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey of Latinos, December 2002

Abortion: Acceptable or Not Acceptable?



Source: Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey of Latinos, December 2002

Note: "Don't know" responses not shown.

ASSIMILATION AND ATTITUDES

Assimilation is the process by which immigrants and their offspring adopt some values, beliefs and behaviors more characteristic of the U.S. culture than the culture of the countries from which they or their ancestors originate. This is neither a complete nor a uniform process, as some individuals change more than others and some attitudes change more than others.

Results from a series of national surveys conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in partnership with the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation from 2002 to 2004 show clearly that the acquisition of English plays a central role in assimilation. In general, the attitudes of English-dominant Hispanics are much more similar to those held by non-Latinos than are the attitudes of Spanish-dominant Latinos. The correlation extends across a wide range of topics, ranging from attitudes on the acceptability of abortion to beliefs about an individual's ability to control his or her own destiny. Language is found to contribute substantially to differences in attitudes even after controlling for many other factors, such as age, gender, education, income and country of origin.

Spanish is the dominant language of the Hispanic adult population because of the presence of immigrants. Even so, more than a quarter of the foreign-born population speaks some English. The language profile is very different among native-born Latinos. Nearly half of the second generation only speaks English and the other half is almost all bilingual, meaning they can speak and read both languages. Virtually all Latinos whose parents were born in the United States speak English and none are Spanish dominant.

The Pew/Kaiser surveys have found that Spanish-dominant Latinos — those who have little or no mastery of English and who primarily rely on Spanish in their home and work lives — have strikingly different opinions about controversial social issues such as abortion, divorce and homosexuality. For example, only 10% of Spanish-dominant Latinos say they find abortion acceptable, compared with 36% of English-dominant Hispanics. On this issue, as on questions about divorce and homosexuality, the English-dominant Latinos have views that are closer to those of whites than to those of Spanish-dominant Latinos.


Fatalism, or the belief that it does not do any good to plan for the future because you do not have any control over your fate, is widespread in Latin America, particularly among the poor. A majority of Spanish-dominant Latinos, overwhelmingly an immigrant population, espouse this view, but its prevalence is lower among Hispanics who are bilingual, and lower still among those who are English dominant. These two categories of Latinos, primarily a native-born population, have views on this topic similar to non-Hispanics.

Assimilation involves not only personal beliefs but also perceptions of the host society. Asked whether discrimination is a problem that is preventing Latinos from getting ahead in the United States, only a small minority responds that it is not a problem at all. However, there is wide variation according to language use in the share of Latinos who say it is a major problem. The Spanish dominant are almost twice as likely as the English dominant to say discrimination is a major problem.

Aside from suggesting a process of changing attitudes, the survey responses on fatalism and discrimination also probably reflect real experiences. It seems safe to say that the greater pessimism of the Spanish dominant is partially a product of their lower socio-economic status and the fact that many are undocumented immigrants.


All categories of Latinos take a more positive view of illegal or undocumented immigrants than do non-Hispanic whites or blacks. But the bilingual are about twice as likely as the Spanish dominant to say that illegal immigrants hurt the economy. English-dominant Latinos are four times as likely to say that illegal immigrants hurt the economy.

Fatalism: Do you agree or disagree that it doesn't do any good to plan for the future because you don't have any control over it?



Source: Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey of Latinos, December 2002
Note: "Don't know" responses not shown.

Is Discrimination Preventing Hispanics from Succeeding in the U.S.?



Source: Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey of Latinos, December 2002
Note: "Don't know" responses not shown.

Do illegal immigrants help the economy by providing low cost labor or do they hurt it by driving down wages?

	HISPANICS			NON-HISPANICS	
	SPANISH DOMINANT	BILINGUAL	ENGLISH DOMINANT	WHITES	BLACKS
Help	85%	66%	51%	26%	26%
Hurt	10%	23%	43%	68%	66%

Source: Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey of Latinos, December 2002
Note: "Don't know" responses not shown.

How Latinos Identify Themselves

	BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	AS LATINO OR HISPANIC	AS AMERICAN
Spanish dominant	68%	27%	3%
Bilingual	52%	24%	22%
English dominant	29%	17%	51%
First generation	68%	24%	6%
Second generation	38%	24%	35%
Third and higher generations	21%	20%	57%

Source: Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey of Latinos, December 2002

Note: This table refers to either the first or the only term used by Latino respondents to the survey to identify themselves.

“That link to a country of origin never fades entirely, even among Hispanics who have to look back at least to a grandparent to find immigrant ancestry. However, there is a clear trend in which “American” becomes a more favored identity among Latinos who speak more English and less Spanish and who trace their roots in the United States back a generation or more.”

Some of the most perplexing — and most hotly debated — questions about the Latino population involve group identity. Will immigrants and their offspring hold their allegiance to their country of origin? Will Latinos come together as an ethnic group with a common sense of identity, political purpose and culture that is shared across nationalities and generations? Will they eventually become like the many descendants of European immigrants who shed national and ethnic identities in favor of seeing themselves as Americans?

The survey data suggest that the answers will come in a gradual process that plays itself out across generations and that language again is a central factor. In the Spanish-dominant, immigrant segment of the Latino population about two thirds of respondents identify themselves with their native lands. That link to a country of origin never fades entirely, even among Hispanics who have to look back at least to a grandparent to find immigrant ancestry. However, there is a clear trend in which “American” becomes a more favored identity among Latinos who speak more English and less Spanish and who trace their roots in the United States back a generation or more. Meanwhile, “Latino” and “Hispanic” are not the most favored terms in any segment of the population, although a significant share across the board chooses them. How these varied strands of identity affect the ways Latinos relate to each other and to the nation as a whole is still very much an open question.

Stateline.org is a free online news service that reports each weekday on significant state policy developments and trends. It tracks issues that directly affect people's lives — issues such as health care, education, tax policy and budget policy — in order to provide timely, trustworthy information to state officials, journalists and citizens involved in the public policy debate.

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6

The States

Policy Innovation Amid Fiscal Constraint

Four of the past five U.S. presidents, including George W. Bush, were governors first – a useful reminder about where much of the country's political energy and policymaking expertise originates.

States are front-line providers of basic services such as education, health care, transportation, public safety and law enforcement. They deal with real human needs in real time, and they have little choice but to be disciplined and innovative in solving their problems. Unlike the federal government, they are limited by the requirement (written into 49 of 50 state constitutions, with Vermont's the sole exception) that they balance their budget each year. States also are constrained by their legislative calendars. Just eight states have legislatures that meet year-round; 36 meet in regular session for part of the year, and six hold regular legislative sessions only every other year. In short, when states make policy, they often do so under severe pressures of time and money.


PARTISAN ALIGNMENT OF THE STATES

This chapter provides an overview of the major policy and fiscal issues facing these laboratories of democracy, as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously described the states. But first it reviews the current partisan political alignment of the states, an exercise that dramatizes another key difference between the states and the federal government: The familiar red state/blue state map that works so well for presidential campaigns looks quite different at the next level down of government.


In the 2004 presidential race, 31 states went for President Bush and 19 for Democrat John Kerry. This lineup was little changed from 2000. In fact, just three of the 50 states switched their presidential preference between 2000 and 2004 — New Hampshire moved over to the Democratic column; Iowa and New Mexico went over to the Republican side — and in all three cases, the new verdict was the result of a small shift (of 2.3 percentage points or fewer) within a basically evenly divided state electorate.

However, this seemingly locked-in Electoral College map for presidential races obscures the texture and fluidity of politics at the state level. And it hides some anomalies. For example, California, New York and Massachusetts, three of the bluest Democratic states, have Republican governors, while Virginia and Montana, two of the reddest Republican states, are led by Democrats. One explanation favored by political scientists: Campaigns for national office tend to be driven more by ideology; campaigns for state executive office tend to turn more on managerial competence. Republicans currently hold 28 governorships

Presidential Vote by State, 2004




Governors by Party, 2005



Note: Washington governor's race still being challenged.


Upcoming Governors' Races: More Red States Than Blue



and the Democrats hold 22, but the balance could shift dramatically when voters in 34 states pick their leaders next year. (Just two states, New Jersey and Virginia, will elect governors in 2005.) In 2006, Democrats will have some built-in advantages. Of the 36 governors' races, 22 Republican-held seats are at stake, and in six of those the incumbent cannot run again because of term limits. By contrast, all 14 Democratic governors up for re-election in 2006 will be eligible to run for another term.

Republicans and Democrats stand nearly dead even in political control of state legislatures. In the 2004 election, while Republicans were running the table in the contests for federal office, Democrats picked up a small number of state legislative seats, breaking out of a slump that began in the 1980s, following a half century of Democratic domination of state legislatures. Democrats won back 76 state legislative seats last year to take a minuscule 12-seat advantage among the combined total of 7,382 state legislators in the 50 states. A flurry of post-election party switching left the parties hovering at a near-even split as 2005 began. Tallying up legislative chambers rather than individual legislators, Republicans control 20 state legislatures, the Democrats 20, and nine states are split, one party holding the state house and the other the state senate. (Nebraska has a unicameral, nominally nonpartisan Legislature.)

State Legislatures by Party, 2005



Source: National Conference of State Legislatures

Top Ten Tuition Hikes at State Universities

UNIVERSITY	2003-4 TUITION	2004-5 TUITION	CHANGE	PERCENT
Univ. of Houston	\$3,972	\$4,978	\$1,006	25.3
Univ. of Texas at Arlington	\$4,423	\$5,300	\$877	19.8
North Dakota State Univ.	\$3,965	\$4,733	\$768	19.4
Texas A & M Univ.	\$5,051	\$5,964	\$913	18.1
Northern Kentucky Univ.	\$3,744	\$4,368	\$624	16.7
Univ. of North Dakota	\$4,156	\$4,828	\$672	16.2
Univ. of Kansas	\$4,101	\$4,737	\$636	15.5
Kansas State Univ.	\$4,060	\$4,665	\$605	14.9
Southern Illinois Univ.	\$5,521	\$6,340	\$819	14.8
Virginia Polytechnic Institute	\$5,095	\$5,838	\$743	14.6
Oklahoma State Univ.	\$3,748	\$4,296	\$548	14.6

Source: National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges. Figures are for in-state tuition.



Termed out: California's John Burton gets an outgoing hug from Governor Schwarzenegger.

Associated Press World Wide

THE FISCAL OUTLOOK

After 20 years in which their spending grew by 6.5% annually, states faced plunging revenues in 2001 — the result of a national recession that began that spring and deepened following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It was the worst fiscal crisis for states in six decades, and it forced drastic budget belt-tightening to close budget gaps that collectively totaled \$236.2 billion between fiscal 2002 and fiscal 2005.

State colleges and universities quickly felt the pinch; many were forced into steep tuition increases. Medicaid, the health care program for 52 million poor, elderly and disabled people that is both federally and state financed, also took a hit, though the blow was cushioned by a one-time, \$10 billion federal payout to the states in 2003. At the height of the fiscal crisis, budgetary pressure was so severe Kentucky granted more than 850 nonviolent felons early release from prison. The move created a gigantic political headache for then-Gov. Paul Patton (D) when one newly freed inmate celebrated by allegedly robbing a bank.

State revenues reached a low point in mid-2002. Then, as the national recession ended and a patchy recovery began, the state fiscal crisis subsided in 2004. Based on a survey of state budget directors, the National Conference of State Legislatures reported in December that budget gaps were “practically non-existent” and that finances were “stable or improving” for most states. For the first quarter of fiscal 2005, the Albany, N.Y.-based Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government reported that tax revenue in the 50 states grew by 8.4% compared with a year earlier, but it also found that “state tax resources are still well below what they were before the 2001 recession.”


POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Health Care

There are now a record 45 million Americans who have no health insurance. The most innovative effort to address the problem is being undertaken by Maine, which has the highest rate of uninsured people in New England and which this year is launching its Dirigo program (named for the state's motto, Latin for "I lead"). It is an experiment in universal health care, with a first step of helping small businesses buy insurance for employees. The program aims to cover 31,000 uninsured in 2005 and another 110,000 over the next five years, and will be paid for by shifting a portion of the \$7 billion that Maine spends annually on treating illnesses.

Other states are trying new ways to help residents cope with the spiraling cost of prescription drugs. Last year, a bipartisan group of Republican and Democratic governors in Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Wisconsin, and the secretary of state in Rhode Island, defied the federal government and established Web sites or importation programs to help citizens buy cut-rate medications from Canada or Europe.

"The re-importation of prescription medicines from Canada is a way to put pressure on the federal government and the [pharmaceutical] industry for change," Republican Gov. Tim Pawlenty of Minnesota, a leader of the drive, told *Stateline.org*.



Drugs from Canada: Minnesota politicians, including Gov. Tim Pawlenty (right), tout the state's new medication Web site.

Associated Press World Wide

Environment

On the environmental front, several states are tackling the issue of global warming in the absence of strong federal action. California is poised to impose the nation's first limits on automobile emissions to curb greenhouse gases, which trap heat in the atmosphere and are blamed for causing a warming of the Earth. Seven East Coast states — Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont — will adopt the same limits because they have opted to follow California's stricter vehicle emissions standards rather than national standards. The new standards would require cleaner-running cars starting in model year 2009. But the regulations first must be approved by the federal government and survive a legal challenge from the auto industry. California's requirements call for carbon-dioxide emissions to be cut by 30%. Car manufacturers contended in a lawsuit filed December 7 in U.S. District Court in Fresno, Calif., that the new emission cutbacks are an illegal, backdoor attempt to impose vehicle fuel economy standards stronger than those set by the U.S. Congress.

Stem Cell Research

Several states are taking the initiative on embryonic stem cell research, which medical experts hope will lead to treatments for illnesses such as Parkinson's and Alzheimer's diseases. Last year New Jersey became the first state to fund embryonic stem cell research through a newly created institute, and on November 4, California positioned itself as a potential world leader when voters approved a plan to spend \$3 billion over a decade for the nation's largest research program on embryonic stem cells. Wisconsin, whose state university cultured the first embryonic stem cells, quickly followed up with plans for a \$750 million publicly and privately funded stem-cell research effort. These state initiatives are at odds with federal policy, which sharply limits the same research because of moral and religious arguments against destroying human embryos to harvest their stem cells.



Exchange of views: Rival protesters outside the Massachusetts Statehouse.

Associated Press World Wide

Gay Marriage

Another state-federal conflict broke out when Massachusetts became the first state to legalize same-sex marriage last May. The state's Supreme Judicial Court ruled that denying gays and lesbians the right to wed violated the state Constitution, which was written by John Adams in 1779. The Massachusetts ruling — and a short-lived wave of same-sex weddings in places such as San Francisco and Portland, Ore. — triggered a powerful backlash from social conservatives, who feared that gay nuptials might have to be recognized throughout the country under the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law.

Between August and November of 2004, voters in 13 states — Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon and Utah — attached amendments to their state constitutions to define marriage as an exclusively heterosexual union. All these initiatives passed by lopsided margins, with the "yes" votes ranging from a low of 57% to a high of 86%. Four states already had such language in their constitutions — Alaska, Nevada, Hawaii and Nebraska.

Lawmakers in at least 10 more states — Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and Washington — plan to try to constitutionally ban gay marriage in 2005. Even Massachusetts, the only state where same-sex weddings still go on, may vote to amend its Constitution at its first opportunity in 2006. "It's clear that the American public is not ready for same-sex marriage and is willing to take strong steps to stop it from becoming a reality," observed the Rev. Peter Sprigg, director of marriage and family studies for the Family Research Council, a conservative lobbying group based in Washington, D.C. It is also clear that states have found it easier and quicker to write anti-gay marriage clauses into their own constitutions than to wait for a similar change to the U.S. Constitution. President Bush has endorsed such an amendment, but the barriers to changing the U.S. Constitution are high, and there is no immediate prospect of congressional action.

Meanwhile, same-sex marriage advocates continue to press for more Massachusetts-type rulings. They have filed lawsuits in California, Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Washington that could reach the highest courts of these states in 2005 or 2006.

Gay Marriage and Civil Unions: Where States Stand

STATE	PERMITS GAY MARRIAGE	PERMITS CIVIL UNIONS	STATE OFFERS REGISTRY OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS	STATE LAW PROHIBITS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE	STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROHIBITS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE	NO STATE LAW OR POLICY	NOTES
Alabama				✓			
Alaska				✓	✓		
Arizona				✓			
Arkansas				✓	✓✓		
California			✓	✓			
Colorado				✓			
Connecticut						✓	
Delaware				✓			
Florida				✓			
Georgia				✓	✓✓		
Hawaii			✓	✓	✓*		* Amendment does not ban same-sex marriage, but stipulates that only the legislature, not the courts, can define marriage.
Idaho				✓			
Illinois				✓			
Indiana				✓			
Iowa				✓			
Kansas				✓			
Kentucky				✓	✓✓		
Louisiana				✓	✓✓*		* Amendment was tossed out by a state court two weeks after it was adopted Sept. 18, 2004, but that ruling is under appeal.
Maine			✓	✓			
Maryland				✓*			* The first state law defining marriage as a union between a man and woman was adopted by Maryland in 1973.
Massachusetts	✓					✓	
Michigan				✓	✓✓		
Minnesota				✓			
Mississippi				✓	✓		
Missouri				✓	✓		
Montana				✓	✓		
Nebraska					✓✓		
Nevada					✓		
New Hampshire				✓			
New Jersey			✓			✓	
New Mexico						✓	
New York						✓	
North Carolina				✓			
North Dakota				✓	✓✓		
Ohio				✓✓	✓✓		
Oklahoma				✓	✓✓*		* Includes a provision making it a misdemeanor crime to knowingly issue a marriage license to same-sex couples.
Oregon					✓		
Pennsylvania				✓			
Rhode Island						✓	
South Carolina				✓			
South Dakota				✓			
Tennessee				✓			
Texas				✓			
Utah				✓	✓✓		
Vermont		✓		✓			
Virginia				✓✓			
Washington				✓			
West Virginia				✓			
Wisconsin				✓*			* 1971 state Supreme Court ruling held that only heterosexual marriages are legal.
Wyoming				✓*			* State law predating federal law prohibits same-sex marriage.

✓✓ signifies law also prohibits civil unions or other domestic partnership status for same-sex couples

Education

Discord of a different variety — between federal and state officials — has flared over President Bush’s attempts to raise academic standards in the nation’s public schools, especially in schools where students are performing below grade level. States, which have the primary responsibility for public education in America, have protested at the costs, at the penalties, and at the unprecedented federal oversight imposed by the No Child Left Behind Act. The law, a key domestic policy accomplishment of Bush’s first term, requires that all schoolchildren become proficient in reading and math by 2014, and it invokes penalties if test results don’t show progress.

The issue has inflamed the always-simmering resentment at the state level over the imposition of mandates from Washington, D.C., without the appropriation of sufficient funds to carry them out. The latest batches of test results are showing some progress in pushing school districts to make the grade. But new teacher certification requirements that will take effect at the end of the 2005-2006 school year and penalties due to be imposed on failing schools are potential flash points.

Medicaid

Medicaid in 2004 for the first time eclipsed elementary and secondary education as the single largest state expenditure. The states’ share of expenses in the federal-state health care program for America’s least fortunate is expected to jump almost 12% this year. No relief is in sight. A survey last fall by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured found that none of the 50 state Medicaid directors expects the strain on state health budgets to ease anytime soon. “As we look into the future, the states face tremendous challenges in financing and administering” the program, said Vernon Smith, a former Medicaid director in Michigan who conducted the study.

To get federal matching funds, states must provide essential benefits, including hospital care, to people who qualify for Medicaid, but state officials have flexibility to decide what benefits to offer beyond the core package. Faced with tight revenues and skyrocketing costs, states are cutting where they can. Some examples:

- Georgia tightened the income eligibility limit for 7,500 pregnant women and their infants, lowering the income cutoff from 235% of the poverty line to 200%. It also halted coverage for 1,700 medically needy nursing home patients.
- Oregon closed enrollment in a program that covers adults who do not qualify for traditional Medicaid but have incomes at or below the federal poverty level. The move was designed to reduce its caseload by half, from 54,000 patients to between 25,000 and 30,000.
- Michigan Gov. Jennifer Granholm (D) led a drive to raise cigarette taxes to \$2 per pack, netting her state about \$310 million a year, to avoid cutting payments to health care providers who serve Medicaid patients.
- In Mississippi, which faced a projected \$709 million budget deficit, Gov. Haley Barbour (R) last year won a federal waiver to temporarily stave off cutting 65,000 elderly and disabled people from Medicaid.
- Tennessee’s landmark decade-old TennCare program, designed to expand Medicaid’s reach to working families who could not afford private insurance, is on the verge of a collapse or a major downscaling. The idea behind TennCare was that by aggressively managing the health care of its participants, the program could cover far more people for the same dollars that were spent on Medicaid. But the program encountered large overruns from the start and grew to consume a third of the state’s budget. In late 2004, Tennessee Gov. Phil Bredesen (D) threatened to pull the plug on TennCare absent a major overhaul. Reverting to a bare-bones Medicaid program would strip coverage from about 430,000 of the plan’s 1.3 million participants.


Homeland Security

One casualty of the September 11 terrorist attacks was the illusion of safety from foreign enemies within the borders of the United States. As all of America became a potential target, the states took on many new responsibilities for the common defense. For the first time, police officers, firefighters and emergency medical technicians were called on to think of themselves as serving on the front lines of a global war on terrorism. Challenges included everything from ensuring that first responders can communicate with each other – the policy catchword is “interoperability” – to dusting off and updating antiquated quarantine laws to better protect public health in the event of bioterrorism.

Meanwhile, the deployment of state-based National Guard soldiers to Iraq, Afghanistan, and other overseas theaters last year reached levels unseen since World War II, raising concerns for governors who rely on these forces to protect sensitive domestic facilities and to help out in natural disasters. Many states recorded their first Guard combat deaths since the 1950-53 Korean War. Of 1,340 military deaths in Iraq as of early January, 152 were from the Guard.

What the States Spend Money On

TOTAL STATE EXPENDITURES BY FUNCTION, FISCAL 2004



Source: National Association of State Budget Officers

For the first time in a decade, Army National Guard recruiters during the last fiscal year fell short of enlistment goals – by more than 5,000 recruits – as fallout from the soldiers’ hazardous new duties and lengthy deployments hit home. In October and November, recruitment was down even more, by 30%. In Iowa, where more than 70% of the state’s 9,600 guardsmen have been called to active duty since Sept. 11, 2001, recruitment was down 15%. The Guard “was not ready for this challenge,” Iowa Gov. Tom Vilsack (D) told the National Governors Association in July 2004.

Antiterrorism Funding: What the States Got, 2002-'04

STATE	TOTAL ALLOCATED, FY '02-'04 (IN MILLIONS)	PER CAPITA
Wyoming	\$49.7	\$100.63
Alaska	\$61.5	\$98.14
Vermont	\$53.4	\$87.68
North Dakota	\$53.7	\$83.63
South Dakota	\$60.3	\$79.84
Montana	\$68.3	\$75.66
Delaware	\$54.3	\$69.30
Hawaii	\$74.4	\$61.42
New Hampshire	\$73.6	\$59.57
Maine	\$73.8	\$57.87
Rhode Island	\$59.6	\$56.84
Idaho	\$63.3	\$48.95
West Virginia	\$81.5	\$45.09
Louisiana	\$193.9	\$43.39
Nebraska	\$71.3	\$41.65
Nevada	\$82.1	\$41.06
Arkansas	\$102.6	\$38.39
Washington	\$226.2	\$38.37
New Mexico	\$67.7	\$37.22
Mississippi	\$104.2	\$36.63
Iowa	\$106.3	\$36.32
New York	\$664.2	\$35.00
Oregon	\$113.9	\$33.30
Missouri	\$184.9	\$33.05
Kansas	\$88.2	\$32.80
Utah	\$72.5	\$32.47
Connecticut	\$109.5	\$32.16
Kentucky	\$127.0	\$31.41
South Carolina	\$125.9	\$31.38
Minnesota	\$151.8	\$30.85
Maryland	\$162.2	\$30.63
Massachusetts	\$192.6	\$30.33
Alabama	\$128.8	\$28.97
Oklahoma	\$99.6	\$28.85
Colorado	\$124.0	\$28.82
New Jersey	\$237.5	\$28.22
Tennessee	\$154.2	\$27.10
Pennsylvania	\$331.6	\$27.00
Illinois	\$333.3	\$26.84
Virginia	\$187.4	\$26.48
Arizona	\$135.4	\$26.39
Wisconsin	\$138.6	\$25.85
Indiana	\$153.0	\$25.15
California	\$803.0	\$23.71
Ohio	\$265.5	\$23.38
Texas	\$478.9	\$22.97
North Carolina	\$183.8	\$22.83
Florida	\$362.8	\$22.70
Michigan	\$214.4	\$21.57
Georgia	\$175.6	\$21.47
TOTAL	\$8,591.4	

Source: Department of Homeland Security

Note: Per capita spending was calculated by dividing state homeland security appropriations by state populations (2000 Census). Grand total includes \$165.5 million for territories, etc., and \$144.3 million for the District of Columbia (\$252.16 per capita).

The threat from al Qaeda has brought state and local governments an infusion of federal cash — \$2.9 billion last year, with roughly the same amount on the way this year from the Department of Homeland Security. But the influx of money has sparked a debate over how the antiterrorism funds are being distributed and whether they really are making the nation safer.

Wyoming received more than \$100 per person in antiterrorism money from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security from 2002 to 2004 — an influx that has enabled officials in the sparsely populated rural state to make extensive upgrades to security. By contrast, the state of New York, where 2,801 people died in the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, has received only \$35 per person. Other populous states, including Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Texas, have gotten even less per capita than New York.

In Alaska, which is second only to Wyoming in its per capita take of federal antiterrorism funds, officials are struggling to find acceptable uses for the money. In one remote area near the Arctic Circle, \$233,000 in homeland security grants reportedly has purchased emergency radio equipment, decontamination tents, headlamps, night-vision goggles, bullhorns and rubber boots. Federal officials rejected the state's proposal to purchase a jet with homeland security money.

Revenue Sources

Forty-nine states rely on income or sales taxes or a combination of both to pay for most government operations; only oil-rich Alaska has no broad-based taxes. Because every state except Vermont is constitutionally required to balance its budget, higher taxes often are the only alternative to cuts in programs and services. Legislatures in eight states — Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Virginia — approved broad-based tax increases last year. In addition, voters in California, Colorado, Montana and Oklahoma approved ballot measures in November that hiked taxes to pay for health care programs.

But states' tax structures are outdated. Many were created for a manufacturing-based economy, not for today's high-tech economy that churns out more services than products. States generally do not tax services. In addition, states currently are blocked from collecting a sales tax on most internet purchases — another source of friction between the states and the federal government. In 2005, states will continue to lobby Congress for the go-ahead to require consumers to pay a sales tax on internet purchases, just as they do on store purchases, a new source of tax revenue that could bring the states \$22 billion to \$34 billion by 2008.

In their quest for more revenues, state budget planners are targeting smokers and gamblers. They're also turning to the credit markets. In the wake of the budget crisis that led to the recall of Gov. Gray Davis (D) in 2003, California leaders resorted to issuing bonds to plug that state's projected \$15 billion deficit for the fiscal year that ends June 30. Florida, Michigan, New Jersey and New York also relied on bond issues and other temporary fixes. In the last election, voters approved more than a dozen borrowing proposals to pay for road repair, bridge construction and other infrastructure improvements that used to be financed out of general revenues. Voters in several states also agreed to several bold borrowing initiatives, including California's \$3 billion stem cell research program and a \$150 million conservation project in Utah.

Cigarette and tobacco tax hikes have accounted for about 25% of all state revenue increases in the past three years. Lawmakers in Alabama, Alaska, Michigan, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Virginia singled out smokers for stiffer taxes in 2004. In the November election, voters in Colorado, Montana and Oklahoma also agreed to increase tobacco taxes by amounts ranging from 64 cents to \$1.70 a pack and to use the money for health care. Rhode Island and New Jersey now charge the highest cigarette taxes — \$2.46 and \$2.40 a pack, respectively — in the country.

“In 2005, states will continue to lobby Congress for the go-ahead to require consumers to pay a sales tax on internet purchases, just as they do on store purchases, a new source of tax revenue that could bring the states \$22 billion to \$34 billion by 2008.”

Gambling on Casinos

STATES WITH COMMERCIAL CASINOS

Colorado

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Louisiana

Michigan

Mississippi

Missouri

Nevada

New Jersey

South Dakota

STATES WITH RACINOS (RACETRACK CASINOS)

Delaware

Iowa

Louisiana

New York

New Mexico

Rhode Island

West Virginia

*Racinos were legalized in Maine in 2003 but are still pending local approval

STATES WITH RIVERBOAT/DOCKSIDE CASINOS

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Louisiana

Mississippi

Missouri

Source: American Gaming Association

Legalized gambling also has become one of the fastest-growing sources of new state revenue. All but two states, Hawaii and Utah, rely on gaming to help pay for schools, health care and other basic services. Even conservative Middle America is a mecca for slots and poker players. Forty riverboat and dockside casinos lure gamblers to gangplanks in Illinois, Iowa, Indiana and Missouri. Nearly 400 Native American-run casinos operate in 29 states, from Connecticut to California. And lotteries, once an oddity found in just seven states, now operate in 41, Oklahoma being the latest state to catch Lotto fever.

States made \$14 billion in profits on the \$45 billion in lottery tickets they sold in fiscal 2003, according to the North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries, a trade group that represents state lotteries. Commercial casinos in the 11 states that allow them took in more than \$26.5 billion in fiscal 2003, and Indian-owned casinos in 29 states brought in \$16.7 billion. The latest fad has been the installation of slot or video-poker machines at dog and horse racetracks. The country's 23 "racinos" already draw crowds in seven states, and Maine and Pennsylvania also are about to tap into this revenue source. Fifty-three million Americans — one in four adults — visited a gambling casino in 2003, almost three times the number that attended professional baseball games, according to the gaming industry.

The **Pew Global Attitudes Project** is a series of worldwide public opinion surveys on a broad array of subjects, ranging from people's assessments of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day. Since its inception in 2001, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has surveyed nearly 75,000 people among 50 populations studied (49 countries plus the Palestinian Authority).

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7

Global Opinion

The Spread of Anti-Americanism

The numbers paint a sobering picture. Just a quarter of the French approve of U.S. policies, and the situation is only slightly better in Japan and Germany. Most people around the world worry that U.S. global influence is expanding, and majorities in many countries say America's strong military presence actually increases the chances for war.

The latest survey on America's tarnished global image? No, those findings are from a poll conducted by Newsweek – in 1983. The United States has been down the “ugly American” road before, saddled with a bad image abroad and unable to draw much in the way of international support, even from close allies.

But anti-Americanism is deeper and broader now than at any time in modern history. It is most acute in the Muslim world, but it spans the globe — from Europe to Asia, from South America to Africa. And while much of the animus is aimed directly at President Bush and his policies, especially the war in Iraq, this new global hardening of attitudes amounts to something larger than a thumbs down on the current occupant of the White House.

Simply put, the rest of the world both fears and resents the unrivaled power that the United States has amassed since the Cold War ended. In the eyes of others, the U.S. is a worrisome colossus: It is too quick to act unilaterally, it doesn't do a good job of addressing the world's problems, and it widens the global gulf between rich and poor. On matters of international security, the rest of the world has become deeply suspicious of U.S. motives and openly skeptical of its word. People abroad are more likely to believe that the U.S.-led war on terror has been about controlling Mideast oil and dominating the world than they are to take at face value America's stated objectives of self-defense and global democratization.

Views of America: U.S. Favorability Ratings

	USIA*1999/2000	SUMMER 2002	MAR. 2003	MAY 2003	MAR. 2004
	%	%	%	%	%
Britain	83	75	48	70	58
France	62	63	31	43	37
Germany	78	61	25	45	38
Italy	76	70	34	60	—
Spain	50	—	14	38	—
Russia	37	61	28	36	47
Canada	71	72	—	63	—
Brazil	56	52	—	34	—
Japan	77	72	—	—	—
Indonesia	75	61	—	15	—
South Korea	58	53	—	46	—
Turkey	52	30	12	15	30
Nigeria	46	77	—	61	—
Pakistan	23	10	—	13	21
Jordan	—	25	—	1	5
Morocco	77	—	—	27	27

Source: Pew Global Attitudes, except as noted below

* Countries where 1999/2000 survey data are available. Trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Department of State (Canada trend by Environics International, now Globescan).

Anti-American Views in the Muslim World ...

	RATING OF THE UNITED STATES		
	FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE	VERY UNFAVORABLE
TURKEY	%	%	%
March 2004	30	18	45
May 2003	15	15	68
March 2003	12	17	67
Summer 2002	30	13	42
PAKISTAN			
March 2004	21	11	50
May 2003	13	10	71
Summer 2002	10	11	58
JORDAN			
March 2004	5	26	67
May 2003	1	16	83
Summer 2002	25	18	57
MOROCCO			
March 2004	27	22	46
May 2003	27	13	53

... And in Europe

	RATING OF THE UNITED STATES		
	FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE	VERY UNFAVORABLE
GREAT BRITAIN	%	%	%
March 2004	58	24	10
May 2003	70	14	12
March 2003	48	24	16
Summer 2002	75	12	4
FRANCE			
March 2004	37	42	20
May 2003	43	38	19
March 2003	31	45	22
Summer 2002	63	26	8
GERMANY			
March 2004	38	49	10
May 2003	45	42	12
March 2003	25	41	30
Summer 2002	61	31	4
RUSSIA			
March 2004	47	29	15
May 2003	36	32	23
March 2003	28	43	25
Summer 2002	61	27	6

Source: Pew Global Attitudes

No matter how negative these assessments are, however, they tell only part of a more complicated story. The relationship between the rest of the world and its sole superpower may be rocky, but it has enduring strengths. A majority of people around the world admire America's democratic values and much about its way of life. While they express deep misgivings about the U.S.-led war on terror, they feel more secure living in a world in which no other nation can challenge the United States militarily. In short, while they chafe at the U.S. role as the world's supercop, they're also relieved that no one else is walking the beat.

Since mid-2002, the Pew Global Attitudes Project has been measuring these attitudes — and the paradoxes they embody — in a series of global public opinion surveys. In all, the Project has conducted four separate surveys in a total of 50 populations (49 countries and the Palestinian Authority), interviewing a combined total of nearly 75,000 people, in the last two and a half years. (Complete reports and top-lines on all surveys are available at www.pewglobal.org.)

The surveys have examined public attitudes on a variety of topics, including economic globalization; democracy and governance; social, cultural and religious values, security and terrorism. The one theme that emerges most powerfully from the data is the stark contrast between how the rest of the world views the United States and how the United States views itself. That cleavage is the focus of this chapter.

A Unilateralist Superpower?

At the heart of the decline in world opinion about America is the perception that the United States acts internationally without taking into account the interests of other nations. This has been a consistent theme of Global Attitude Project polls. In 2003, majorities in 16 of 21 populations surveyed said the U.S. paid little or no attention to the interests of their countries. When we went back to a smaller group of countries a year later, solid majorities in seven of the eight nations surveyed (all except the U.S.) said the United States had little concern for their countries' interests when making foreign policy. Even in Great Britain, 61% said the U.S. paid little or no attention to British interests.

Americans have been just as consistent in their view that the United States does, in fact, take the interests of other countries into account. Most Americans think this happens a great deal (34%) or a fair amount (36%); just 27% think the U.S. is mostly unconcerned with other nations.

Post-9/11 Sympathy Short-Lived

To be sure, anti-Americanism in much of the world, especially in many predominantly Muslim nations, predates the U.S. war on terror and the invasion of Iraq. Even in Pakistan, a staunch U.S. ally for decades, just 23% expressed a favorable opinion of the United States in a State Department survey conducted in 1999 and 2000.

Global Perception Gap on American Unilateralism

	A GREAT DEAL/ FAIR AMOUNT	U.S. CONSIDERS OTHERS NOT MUCH/ NOT AT ALL	OTHERS DON'T KNOW/ REFUSED
U.S.	70	27	3
Great Britain	36	61	3
Morocco	34	57	8
Germany	29	69	2
Russia	20	73	2
Jordan	16	77	7
Pakistan	18	48	34
France	14	84	2

Source: Pew Global Attitudes, March 2004

“Americans have been just as consistent in their view that the United States does, in fact, take the interests of other countries into account.”

Perceived Popular Views of September 11 Attacks

	MOST/MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE	
	U.S. POLICY CAUSED ATTACKS	GOOD FOR U.S. TO FEEL VULNERABLE
	%	%
U.S.	18	n/a
Total non-U.S.	58	70
Western Europe	36	66
E. Europe/Russia	71	70
Latin America	58	71
Asia	60	76
Mideast/Conflict Area	81	65
All Islamic states	76	73

Source: Survey of Opinion Leaders, Pew Global Attitudes, December 2001

The terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, had the potential to change this dynamic. Initially, there was a spontaneous outpouring of sympathy and support for the United States, memorably given voice by the famous headline in the French newspaper *Le Monde*: “We are all Americans.” Even some in parts of the Middle East, hostility toward the U.S. appeared to soften a bit.

But this reaction proved short-lived. Just a few months after the attacks, a Global Attitudes Project survey of opinion leaders around the world found that, outside Western Europe, there was a widespread sense that U.S. policies were a major cause of the attacks. Moreover, solid majorities in every region said that most people in their countries believed it was good for Americans to know what it feels like to be vulnerable.

By the time the Project’s first major survey went into the field — in 44 countries and among 38,000 people in the summer and fall of 2002 — it found that favorability ratings for the United States had eroded since 2000 in 19 of the 27 countries where trend benchmarks were available.

With the onset of the war in Iraq in the spring of 2003 it became clear that the U.S. global image hadn’t just slipped, it had plummeted. The second major survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, among 16,000 people in 20 countries and the Palestinian Authority, showed that the war had widened the rift between the United States and its traditional allies and intensified hostility toward the U.S. in the Muslim world. In subsequent surveys there have been a few episodic blips upward, reflecting world events at the time, but the overall trend remains downward.

A Eurobarometer survey conducted in countries of the European Union in October 2003 found that respondents placed the U.S. on a par with Iran as a threat to world peace. Even in the United Kingdom, the United States’ most trusted European ally, 55% said they saw the U.S. as a threat to global peace. And in four countries — Greece, Spain, Finland and Sweden — the United States was viewed as the *greatest* threat to peace, more menacing than Iran or North Korea.

In the Muslim world, opinions about the U.S. have been negative for decades, but in recent years that broad dislike has taken on an aspect of outright fear. In a 2003 Pew survey, majorities in seven of eight predominantly Muslim nations said they believed the U.S. may someday threaten their country — including 71% in Turkey and 58% in Lebanon.

Rising anti-Americanism is not confined to Western Europe and predominantly Muslim countries. In Brazil, 52% expressed a favorable opinion of the United States in 2002; by 2003, that number had dropped to 34%. And while the U.S. image in Russia has been on the upswing, it is still far below where it stood in 2002.


Doubts on Iraq, War on Terror

The 2004 presidential election showed that the American public is deeply divided over the war in Iraq. But except in the United States, reactions to the war are almost uniformly negative. The war in Iraq has badly frayed international unity in the war on terror and, more important, it has further undermined America's global credibility.

At least half the respondents in eight foreign countries surveyed in March 2004 view the U.S. as less trustworthy as a consequence of the war. Large majorities in almost every country surveyed think that American and British leaders lied when they claimed, before the Iraq war, that Saddam Hussein's regime had weapons of mass destruction.


And the U.S.-led war on terror, which was once widely supported as a legitimate response to September 11, is being viewed with increasing skepticism. Many people in France (57%) and Germany (49%) have come to agree with the widespread view in the Muslim countries surveyed that the America is exaggerating the terrorist threat. Only in Great Britain and Russia do large majorities believe that the U.S. is right to be so concerned about terrorism.

Are You Worried about Potential U.S. Military Threat?



Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2003

Did U.S. and British Leaders Lie about Iraqi WMD?




Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

Moreover, this skepticism has caused many people around the world to question not just U.S. antiterrorism policies, but America's motives in the war on terror. In the March 2004 survey, solid majorities in Germany and France — and 41% of the British — said the war on terrorism is not a sincere effort to reduce terrorism.

What do these global skeptics think is America's real objective? In seven of the nine nations surveyed in 2004, majorities of those who doubt U.S. sincerity in the war on terror said America is seeking to control Mideast oil. Nearly as many respondents believe America's ultimate aim is nothing less than world domination. Majorities in the predominantly Muslims nations expressed that opinion, as did about half of the respondents in France and Germany.


Sincerity of U.S. War on Terrorism



Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

And while somewhat fewer people suspect the United States of deliberately targeting Muslim nations and using the war on terror to protect Israel, those perceived motives strike a chord with many in Muslim nations. In Jordan, for example, majorities doubt the sincerity of the U.S. war on terror for all of the reasons listed: They believe that the U.S. seeks Mideast oil; that it wants to dominate the world; that it targets Muslim nations, and that it is trying to protect Israel.

What Are America's Motives?



Questions asked of those who believe the war on terrorism is not a sincere effort, or who have mixed views. Percentages show the portion of the total population who believe each is an important reason the United States is conducting the war on terrorism. Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

Americans, by contrast, overwhelmingly view the war on terrorism as a sincere effort to respond to a global threat. And just 13% of the public here believes the U.S. is overreacting to that threat. These attitudes carry over into significant differences of opinion — especially between the United States and its traditional European allies — over security and the use of force in the post-September 11 era. Respondents in Great Britain, France and Germany strongly endorse the idea of their governments' seeking U.N. approval before using military force. A plurality of Americans disagrees; on this point, Americans find more in common with people in Russia and predominantly Muslim countries, who also are reluctant to cede such power to the United Nations.

Other Policies Cause Friction

There are other major policy differences between Americans and people around the world. For Muslims, it has become almost an article of faith that the United States sides unfairly with Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians; 99% of Jordanians, 96% of Palestinians and 94% of Moroccans agree. So too do most Europeans.

This opinion is even widely shared in Israel itself — in May 2003, nearly half of Israelis said U.S. policy favors Israel too much. At that time, majorities or pluralities in 20 of 21 populations surveyed said U.S. policy was unfair, with Americans the lone exceptions.

But global opposition to strong U.S. support for Israel long predates the Bush administration. While the U.S. stance on the Middle East is a factor in longstanding hostility toward the U.S. among Muslim populations, America's international image has suffered much more as a consequence of the war in Iraq. Similarly, Europeans believe the United States does too little to solve world problems and backs policies that increase the yawning global gap between rich and poor. However, these sentiments also were evident well before the war in Iraq and the recent steep decline in favorable attitudes to the United States.

U.S. Middle East Policy

	FAVORS ISRAEL	FAIR	FAVORS PALESTINE	DK/REFUSED
	%	%	%	%
Jordan	99	1	*	*
Palestinian Authority	96	*	2	2
Morocco	94	1	2	3
Lebanon	90	5	1	4
Kuwait	77	14	1	8
Indonesia	76	6	4	14
Turkey	67	5	5	23
Pakistan	64	7	7	22
France	56	28	7	9
Germany	56	17	6	21
Spain	52	13	5	30
Great Britain	48	29	3	20
Israel	47	38	11	5
Italy	42	31	5	22
Canada	37	33	4	26
Russia	29	10	7	53
United States	27	47	8	18

Source: Pew Global Attitudes, May 2003

Global Objections to America's Foreign Policy

	U.S. DOESN'T SOLVE WORLD'S PROBLEMS*	U.S. INCREASES POVERTY GAP
	%	%
NORTH AMERICA		
Canada	68	68
WESTERN EUROPE		
France	74	69
Italy	60	58
Great Britain	60	53
Germany	47	70
EASTERN EUROPE		
Russia	54	53
Poland	52	49
Bulgaria	48	48
Slovak Republic	45	62
Ukraine	44	54
Czech Republic	38	54
CONFLICT AREA		
Egypt	78	42
Lebanon	68	73
Jordan	63	70
Turkey	63	63
Pakistan	58	39
Uzbekistan	55	40
LATIN AMERICA		
Venezuela	85	48
Bolivia	76	74
Mexico	74	55
Guatemala	69	55
Honduras	67	45
Argentina	65	67
Brazil	65	60
Peru	60	55
ASIA**		
Indonesia	76	53
South Korea	65	67
Vietnam	64	63
Japan	60	69
India	59	46
Bangladesh	53	41
Philippines	44	33
AFRICA		
Nigeria	76	22
Angola	69	56
Kenya	67	24
South Africa	66	41
Ghana	65	31
Uganda	64	36
Mali	59	49
Tanzania	56	48
Ivory Coast	53	51
Senegal	46	49

* Includes those who said the U.S. does "too much," those who said it does "too little," and those volunteering that the U.S. does "nothing."

** These questions were not permitted in China.

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2002

Americans Liked Better Than America

For the most part, people in Western Europe retain a good opinion of Americans despite their opposition to the United States and many of its policies. But the French have increasingly soured on the American people in recent years; positive assessments of Americans have declined from 71% in 2002 to 53% two years later.

The image of Americans is not nearly as strong in predominantly Muslim countries, and it has eroded noticeably in Jordan and Morocco. In Morocco, a long-time U.S. ally in North Africa, 37% expressed a favorable view of Americans in 2004, down from 54% just a year earlier.

President Bush's reelection may influence how global publics view Americans. Throughout his first term, Bush was the lightning rod for the world's criticism of America's foreign policy. Now that the American people have awarded Bush a second term in a high-turnout election that focused to an unusual degree on foreign policy, it may be more difficult for the rest of the world to separate the presidential policies and leadership style it dislikes from the American people and values it admires.

Before the election, Bush was viewed extremely negatively by global publics. Majorities in every country surveyed in 2004 (except the U.S.) had an unfavorable opinion of the president, with negative ratings ranging from 57% in Great Britain (with 39% favorable) to 85% in both France and Germany. Six in ten Russians had an unfavorable view of Bush, as did two thirds of the people of Turkey. Feelings about Bush were nearly unanimously negative in Jordan (96% unfavorable) and Morocco (90%), and almost as low in Pakistan (87%).


Enduring U.S. Strengths: Ideals, Technology

Despite the widespread hostility toward the United States and many of its policies, the democratic ideals that America has long promoted remain broadly popular. Freedom of speech, fair elections and an impartial judiciary are prized goals for people around the world. However, there is somewhat less support for these ideals in predominantly Muslim countries than in other developing countries.

Even globalization and expanded trade are widely supported, although people around the world are ambivalent about consumerism and the influence of American customs on their own country.

The love-hate relationship that people around the world have long had with things American is seen in conflicting attitudes toward U.S. technology and American pop culture. Our 2002 survey found broad admiration for U.S. technology. Even in Jordan, where both the United States and Americans are held in low regard, 64% of the people said they have a high opinion of U.S. technology.

Views of Americans, Percent Favorable



Source: Pew Global Attitudes

Commitment to Democratic Ideals

	IT'S VERY IMPORTANT TO LIVE IN A COUNTRY WHERE ...		
	PEOPLE CAN OPENLY CRITICIZE THE GOV'T.	THERE ARE HONEST, TWO-PARTY ELECTIONS	THE MEDIA CAN REPORT WITHOUT CENSORSHIP
REGIONAL MEDIANS	%	%	%
Latin America	71	66	67
Sub-Saharan Africa*	71	73	63
Eastern Europe	57	60	60
PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES			
Mali	79	82	68
Turkey	83	75	68
Bangladesh	81	71	64
Senegal	71	87	53
Lebanon	67	71	57
Pakistan	63	46	38
Indonesia	56	40	40
Uzbekistan	42	42	44
Jordan	32	28	35
SIGNIFICANT MUSLIM POPULATIONS			
Nigeria	68	75	69
Tanzania	56	62	42

* Includes African nations with relatively small Muslim populations: Angola, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda. Questions not permitted in Egypt.

Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2002

Note: Based on total national population. In nations with significant Muslim and non-Muslim populations (Lebanon, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania) an analysis of Muslim and non-Muslim responses shows no systematic differences by religion.

The World Likes American Popular Culture ...

	LIKE	DISLIKE	DK/REF.
NORTH AMERICA	%	%	%
Canada	77	17	6
WESTERN EUROPE			
Great Britain	76	19	5
Germany	66	29	5
France	66	32	3
Italy	63	29	9
EASTERN EUROPE			
Poland	70	22	8
Bulgaria	64	25	11
Czech Republic	59	37	4
Slovak Republic	58	39	3
Ukraine	55	42	3
Russia	42	50	9
CONFLICT AREA			
Lebanon	65	34	1
Uzbekistan	51	44	5
Turkey	44	46	10
Egypt	33	57	10
Jordan	30	67	3
Pakistan	4	79	17
LATIN AMERICA			
Venezuela	78	20	2
Honduras	71	25	4
Guatemala	70	26	5
Brazil	69	29	2
Mexico	60	30	10
Peru	46	43	11
Bolivia	39	54	7
Argentina	52	38	10

2002 Pew Global Attitudes Survey

And while most people around the world acknowledge they like American movies, music and television, they view the export of American ideas and customs as a bad thing. More than half of Canadians say it is unfortunate that American ideas and customs are spreading there. Europeans are even more adamant: 72% of French, 70% of Germans and 56% of Britons regard the spread of American culture negatively. In all of these countries, however, large majorities of respondents – especially young people – say they like American movies and other cultural exports.

... But Dislikes Spread of American Ideas and Customs

	GOOD	BAD	DK/REF.
NORTH AMERICA	%	%	%
Canada	37	54	8
WESTERN EUROPE			
Great Britain	39	50	11
Italy	29	58	12
Germany	28	67	6
France	25	71	4
EASTERN EUROPE			
Bulgaria	36	32	33
Ukraine	35	58	7
Slovak Republic	34	60	7
Czech Republic	34	61	6
Poland	31	55	14
Russia	16	68	15
CONFLICT AREA			
Uzbekistan	33	56	11
Lebanon	26	67	7
Jordan	13	82	5
Turkey	11	78	11
Egypt	6	84	10
Pakistan	2	81	17
LATIN AMERICA			
Venezuela	44	52	4
Honduras	44	53	4
Guatemala	40	53	7
Peru	37	50	13
Brazil	30	62	8
Mexico	22	65	13
Bolivia	22	73	5
Argentina	16	73	11
ASIA*			
Philippines	58	36	6
Japan	49	35	15
Vietnam	33	60	7
South Korea	30	62	8
India	24	54	22
Indonesia	20	73	7
Bangladesh	14	76	10
AFRICA			
Ivory Coast	69	31	0
Nigeria	64	31	6
Uganda	50	42	8
Ghana	47	40	13
South Africa	43	45	12
Kenya	40	55	5
Mali	35	61	4
Senegal	34	62	4
Angola	33	54	13
Tanzania	18	67	15


**This question was not permitted in China.
2002 Pew Global Attitudes Survey

Transatlantic Values Gap

During the 2004 presidential campaign, the European press devoted considerable attention to a seemingly vast and growing divide in values between America and its traditional allies in Europe. The Pew Global Attitudes Project has found that these differences, while substantial, are not new.

Americans prize individualism and personal empowerment more than do Europeans. For instance, Europeans generally agree that success is determined by forces that are outside an individual's control; Americans, along with Canadians, decisively reject that idea. In addition, there are profound disagreements between the United States and Europe over the role of government. For example, Europeans are much more supportive than Americans of a strong social safety net.


Success Is Determined by Forces Outside Our Control



Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

How Much Should the Government Be a Safety Net?

WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT ...




Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

As much as any other single issue, religion has come to define the transatlantic values gap. Among wealthy nations, the United States has by far the most religious population – and it stands in sharp contrast to mostly secular Western Europe. In a 2002 survey, we found that a 58% majority in the U.S. viewed belief in God as a prerequisite to morality. Just a third of Germans and even fewer Italians, British and French agreed.

Yet it is also the case that these differences have been present for some time. The values gap is no larger than it was in the early 1990s, when the Times-Mirror Center conducted a “Pulse of Europe” survey. Moreover, when we asked global publics if tensions with the U.S. were based mostly on differences in policies or values, majorities in three of four Western European countries surveyed pointed to policies, not values, as the source of friction.

Necessary to Believe in God to be Moral?



Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2002

Looking Ahead

As President Bush begins his second term, he faces a slew of foreign policy issues that have been a source of conflict between his administration and much of the rest of the world — from Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a range of issues involving trade, globalization and the weakening of the U.S. dollar.

On many of these issues, the United States will be seeking cooperation and common ground with its European allies. But it was clear even before the presidential election that the populations of these countries favored a more distant relationship with the U.S. — and a more powerful counterweight to the U.S. in Europe.

Last year, just 40% of the British favored keeping the partnership between the U.S. and Western Europe as close as in the past, down from 51% a year earlier. In Germany, France, Russia and Turkey, there is even less support for maintaining close ties with the U.S. A majority of Americans, by contrast, want relations with Western Europe to remain as close as in the past.


Moreover, half or more of the public in each of the five European nations surveyed in 2004 said it would be a good thing if the European Union becomes as powerful as the United States. The only saving grace for the U.S. in this regard is that there was much less support, in Western Europe and elsewhere, for another country emerging as a rival for the United States.

Checking America

WOULD IT BE A GOOD THING IF EUROPEAN UNION WERE AS POWERFUL AS THE U.S.?




WOULD THE WORLD BE SAFER IF ANOTHER COUNTRY WERE AS POWERFUL AS U.S.?



Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

Postwar Confidence that the U.S. Wants to Promote Democracy



Source: Pew Global Attitudes, 2004

Beyond Europe, the United States continues to face a dangerous deficit of credibility and goodwill. While populations of predominantly Muslim countries are not averse to democracy, they are skeptical of the administration's goal of promoting democracy in the Middle East. The war in Iraq has only intensified these doubts; in March 2004, majorities in Turkey, Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan said the war made them less confident that the U.S. wants to promote democracy.

Can these trends be reversed? Much will depend on the policy choices made in Washington and other global capitals. But much also will depend on the opinions and attitudes of people across an increasingly interconnected world. In the coming years, the Pew Global Attitudes Project will continue to provide a portrait of public opinion around the world. Our goal is to enable policymakers to better understand both the sources of tension between nations and the areas where common ground may foster increased international cooperation and security.

These findings are drawn from polls conducted by the *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, a series of worldwide public opinion surveys. The project has issued two major reports, "What the World Thinks in 2002," based on 38,000 interviews in 44 nations, and "Views of a Changing World, June 2003," based on 16,000 interviews in 20 nations and the Palestinian Authority. The project also conducted a nine-nation poll in March 2004. Surveys were conducted by local organizations under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Full details about the surveys, and the project more generally, are available at www.pewglobal.org.

